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Aaron S. Kesselheim**
There is popular and bipartisan support for legalizing the importation
of lower-cost medicines from Canada to help reduce the high prescription drug
costs that Americans pay. Despite the wide interest in this policy, attempts over
the last sixteen years to create a formal system for large-scale prescription drug
importation in the United States have failed. The Trump Administration
recently issued a final rule to enable the legal importation of prescription drugs
from Canada, but the rule has important design flaws and seems destined to
suffer a similar fate as previous efforts.
In this Article, we argue that prescription drug importation is a form of
international regulatory engagement that can work, but not in the manner that
recent congressional legislation or the Trump Administration has proposed.
Importation of prescription drugs, even foreign versions of already-approved
drugs, requires the importing nation to accept the marketing approval
standards, processes, and product-specific decisions of the exporting nation as
equivalent to domestic regulation. The FDA, however, has made far fewer
determinations of foreign regulatory equivalence than its counterpart
regulators. As a result, the statutory requirements for the FDA maintaining
direct oversight over prescription drug imports from Canada are onerous and
unlikely ever to be fulfilled.
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Examining U.S. prescription drug importation as a form of reliance on
the equivalence of foreign regulation is, as far as we can determine, a novel
inquiry, and it offers useful insights. Foreign equivalence determinations have
been successfully used in pharmaceutical regulation in two contexts: (1) trade
initiatives and (2) circumstances in which regulatory agencies were unable to
fulfill their core institutional mandates without relying on the decisionmaking
of their foreign counterparts. The FDA has not fit neatly into either of these
contexts. In contrast to many of its foreign counterparts, the FDA has
consolidated authority over pharmaceutical regulation, which it sustains
through its reputation among its constituents—appropriators, consumers,
pharmaceutical product sponsors, and the relevant medical and scientific
communities—for overseeing the safety, efficacy, and quality of medicines. The
FDA has resisted risking any harm to that gatekeeper reputation that might
follow from its pursuit of other policy objectives, such as lowering drug prices
or facilitating trade. Furthermore, FDA officials describe themselves as “the
gold standard” for drug review—more thorough and rigorous about regulation
than their counterparts—and, until recently, as able to fulfill their core
institutional mandates without the cooperation of foreign counterparts.
Based on this analysis of the political economy of pharmaceutical
regulation and international regulatory cooperation at the FDA, we propose
that U.S. prescription drug importation could be successfully used to reduce
generic drug shortages, a persistent public health problem that the FDA has
struggled to solve independently. We argue that the same analysis can help
identify other circumstances when the FDA might usefully engage foreign
counterparts, such as foreign manufacturer inspections for the rapidly
increasing volume of U.S. drug imports, the growing complexity of
global pharmaceutical supply chains, and the technological advances in
personalized medicines.
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INTRODUCTION
There is popular, bipartisan support for legalizing the
importation of lower-cost medicines from Canada to help U.S. patients
reduce their high prescription drug costs. Four out of five Americans
favor the policy.1 Vice President Biden and most of the previous
Democratic presidential candidates are also on record supporting
legalized prescription drug importation.2 President Trump likewise
favors allowing prescription drug importation from Canada, as did his
immediate predecessors, Presidents Obama and George W. Bush. 3 Six
states—Vermont, Florida, Colorado, Maine, New Mexico, and New
Hampshire—have passed bills allowing prescription drug imports from
Canada, subject to approval by the U.S. Department of Health and
1.
Ashley Kirzinger, Lunna Lopes, Bryan Wu & Mollyann Brodie, KFF Health Tracking
Poll – February 2019: Prescription Drugs, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-february-2019prescription-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/3MNB-BLMG].
2.
Health Care, BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT, https://joebiden.com/healthcare/ (last visited Aug. 31,
2020) [https://perma.cc/B7MP-M4KY]. Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and his fellow senator and
former presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) co-sponsored S. 469, the Affordable and
Safe Prescription Drug Importation Act, which amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
to require the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to promulgate regulations within 180 days
permitting wholesalers, pharmacies, and individuals to import certain prescription drugs from
Canada. The FDA, within two years, may permit the importation of prescription drugs from other
countries. Other recent U.S. presidential candidates such as Cory Booker, Pete Buttigieg, Julian
Castro, John Delaney, Kamala Harris, Jay Inslee, Amy Klobuchar, Beto O’Rourke, Tim Ryan,
Marianne Williamson, and Andrew Yang are all in favor. How the Democratic Candidates
Responded to a Health Care Policy Survey, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/23/us/politics/2020-democrats-health-care.html [https://perma.cc/3BJ7-MHLQ].
3.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Trump Administration Takes
Historic Steps to Lower U.S. Prescription Drug Prices (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/
about/news/2019/12/18/trump-administration-takes-historic-steps-to-lower-us-prescription-drugprices.html [https://perma.cc/K9XE-Y4T9]; Reuters Staff, Obama Seeks Drug Imports Outside of
Health Bill, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2009, 1:43 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcareimportation/obama-seeks-drug-imports-outside-of-health-bill-idUSTRE5BF0DW20091220
[https://perma.cc/U9NP-CV66]; Robert Pear, Bush Hints at Policy Shift on Canadian Drug
Imports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/12/politics/campaign/bushhints-at-policy-shift-on-canadian-drug-imports.html [https://perma.cc/68FE-WALT].
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Human Services (“HHS”).4 On December 18, 2019, HHS and the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (“NPRM”) and a draft guidance on a pathway to enable the
legal importation of prescription drugs from Canada.5 In July 2020,
President Trump issued an executive order encouraging completion of
this rulemaking process.6 On September 24, 2020, the FDA issued the
final rule, which is scheduled to go into effect on November 24.7
Despite the popularity of this policy, however, past attempts to
legalize large-scale U.S. prescription drug importation have failed. In
2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act (“MMA”) of 2003 (better known as the law that
created Medicare Part D), which provides the HHS secretary with the
authority to permit the importation of prescription drugs from Canada.
In the sixteen subsequent years, no HHS secretary or FDA
commissioner appointed by a president of either party has made the
certifications to Congress necessary for the relevant clause to take
effect: that implementation will both “pose no additional risk to the
public’s health and safety” and “result in a significant reduction in the
cost of covered products to the American consumer.”8 HHS Secretary
Azar made this certification when the final rule was issued, but it is
conditional on state governments and non-federal programs sponsoring
the importation program and meeting the same certification
requirements that the federal government has been unable to satisfy
for nearly two decades.9
In this Article, we argue that prescription drug importation is a
form of international regulatory engagement that can work, but not in
the manner that recent congressional efforts or the Trump
Administration has proposed. Importation of prescription drugs, even
foreign versions of already-approved drugs, requires the importing
4.
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25.5-2.5-201 to 25.5-2.5-207 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 381.02035 (2019);
ME. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 2041-2044 (2019); H.R. 1280, 2020 Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2020) (enacted);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-4-1 to 26-4-10 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4651-4656 (2018).
5.
Importation of Prescription Drugs, 84 Fed. Reg. 70,796 (proposed Dec. 23, 2019) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 251).
6.
Exec. Order 13,938, 85 Fed. Reg. 45,757 (Jul. 24, 2020). The executive order also instructs
the HHS secretary to exercise the enforcement discretion already provided in 21 U.S.C. § 384(j)(1)
against individuals importing prescription drugs for personal use and to permit the re-importation
of insulin upon a finding by the secretary that it is required for emergency medical care, an
authority which also already existed under 21 U.S.C. § 381(d).
7.
Importation of Prescription Drugs, Final Rule #2020-199 (Sept. 24, 2020) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 251), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/importation-final-rule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9LA8-HDCB] (at the time of writing, the final rule has not yet been published in
the Federal Register).
8.
21 U.S.C. § 384(l)(1) (2012).
9.
Importation of Prescription Drugs, Final Rule #2020-199, at 8, 68.
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nation to accept the marketing approval standards and processes of the
exporting nation as equivalent to domestic regulation and to rely on the
product-specific decisions and oversight of the exporting nation. The
FDA, however, has made far fewer determinations of foreign regulatory
equivalence than either its counterpart regulators in other nations or
U.S. regulators, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”).
Past U.S. prescription drug importation initiatives have failed because
they arose under circumstances in which the FDA was unwilling to
depart from that general practice and accept the equivalence of the
marketing approval process of Health Canada and other foreign
national regulatory authorities and to rely on their oversight. FDA
officials have insisted instead on ensuring direct U.S. oversight of the
prescription drug importation process, which has rendered importation
too expensive and impractical to be implemented. 10 Congress has
acceded to FDA demands and, as a result, the statutory requirements
for legal importation of cheaper prescription drugs from Canada are so
onerous that HHS officials have described them as “extremely unlikely”
to be fulfilled.11
Examining U.S. prescription drug importation as a form of
reliance on the equivalence of foreign regulation is, as far as we can
determine, a novel inquiry,12 and it offers two sets of useful insights.
First, examining the theory and practice of international regulatory
engagement—the circumstances in which equivalence determinations
have been successful and the institutional characteristics of the
regulatory agencies that use them—helps identify the reasons that the
FDA has engaged in that form of cooperation far less often than its
counterpart agencies.13 This is important because multiple independent
assessments have found that unless the FDA better leverages the
activities of its foreign counterparts, the agency cannot possibly oversee
the rapidly increasing volume of U.S. drug imports, the growing
10. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32191, PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION: A LEGAL
OVERVIEW 3–9 (2008) (summarizing various FDA statements indicating that it cannot guarantee
the safety or effectiveness of imported drugs that are not FDA-approved, which the FDA has
previously estimated would be prohibitively expensive).
11. Pam Belluck, Vermont Will Sue U.S. for the Right to Import Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11,
2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/11/us/vermont-will-sue-us-for-the-right-to-importdrugs.html [https://perma.cc/B7YC-7G95].
12. But see Kenneth A. Bamberger & Andrew T. Guzman, Keeping Imports Safe: A Proposal
for Discriminatory Regulation of International Trade, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1405, 1424–26 (2008)
(citing importation as a form of equivalence, but the article is focused on the larger topic of import
safety and does not draw on the theory and practice of regulation engagement to explore how to
advance the topic).
13. See, e.g., Daniel Hemel, Note, Regulatory Consolidation and Cross-Border Coordination:
Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 213, 219–30 (2011) (examining theories
of cross-border financial regulation among financial regulators).
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complexity of global pharmaceutical supply chains, and the
technological advances in personalized medicines.14 Second, this
analysis reveals workable approaches to a program of U.S. prescription
drug importation, a potential tool for addressing high U.S. prescription
drug prices, which both disproportionately affect people who are
uninsured or have high-deductible insurance plans and contribute to
U.S. economic inequality. Based on that analysis, we suggest that a
mechanism for U.S. prescription drug importation could be successfully
used to reduce generic drug shortages and extreme price hikes among
off-patent drugs that function like product shortages, and we put
forward a proposal for doing so.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the current
landscape of U.S. prescription drug importation. This section examines
the role of prescription drug imports in the U.S. health care system
generally and the high U.S. drug prices that drive popular demand for
access to cheaper foreign versions. This section also summarizes the
current pathways for legally permissible prescription drug importation
under the U.S. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) of 1938 and
recent congressional and Trump Administration efforts to harness
those pathways.
Part II demonstrates that equivalence determinations are an
established form of international regulatory engagement successfully
used in the pharmaceutical sector in two particular contexts. First,
regulatory equivalence and reliance determinations are often included
in trade initiatives to reduce duplicative or unnecessarily divergent
standards and conformity assessment procedures. Second, agencies
14. See COMM. ON MUT. RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS & RELIANCE IN THE REGULATION OF
MEDS., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., REGULATING MEDICINES IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD:
THE NEED FOR INCREASED RELIANCE AMONG REGULATORS 51 (Alastair J. Wood & Patricia Cuff
eds., 2020) (“Given the large number of manufacturing sites in China and India that are involved
in producing drug[s] . . . for the United States . . . it has not been possible for [the] FDA . . . to
inspect all of these sites . . . in order to assure the quality of products being exported to their
people.”); COMM. ON STRENGTHENING CORE ELEMENTS OF REGULATORY SYS. IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ENSURING SAFE FOODS AND MEDICAL PRODUCTS
THROUGH STRONGER REGULATORY SYSTEMS ABROAD, at ix (Jim E. Riviere & Gillian J. Buckley
eds., 2012) (“The diversity and scale of imports makes it impractical for [FDA] border inspections
to be sufficient to ensure product purity and safety.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO12-933, FOOD SAFETY: FDA CAN BETTER OVERSEE FOOD IMPORTS BY ASSESSING AND LEVERAGING
OTHER COUNTRIES’ OVERSIGHT RESOURCES 38 (2012) (recommending that the FDA use tools like
equivalence to leverage the resources of foreign countries to ensure exports meet U.S.
requirements). The FDA has itself acknowledged the necessity of increased international
regulatory cooperation. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE FDA
FOREIGN OFFICES (2012), https://www.fda.gov/food/food-safety-modernization-act-fsma/2012report-congress-fda-foreign-offices [https://perma.cc/2DFD-H67E] (recognizing that “FDA must
continue to exert its leadership as part of the global regulatory enterprise to assure that
global regulatory standards are consistent with the best science and public health
information available”).
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have turned to regulatory equivalence determinations when
those agencies could not fulfill their core institutional mandates
without relying on the decisionmaking and activities of their
foreign counterparts.
Part III explains why the FDA and its oversight of the
prescription drug market have not fit easily into either of these two
contexts. Drawing from literature on the political economy of
pharmaceutical regulation and international regulatory cooperation,
we argue that the FDA’s limited use of equivalence determinations is
unsurprising. In contrast to the European Commission (“EC”), where
its Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry is charged with
coordinating regulatory protection and trade, the FDA has the
consolidated statutory authority as the gatekeeper for ensuring the
safety, quality, and efficacy of medicines.15 To sustain that authority
and its funding, the FDA depends on its reputation for protecting
consumers from unsafe drugs.16 Accordingly, the FDA has resisted
initiatives that might undermine that reputation and subordinate its
gatekeeping mission to other policy objectives, such as lowering drug
prices or facilitating trade.17 Unlike the nascent or under-resourced
regulators of small or developing nations, FDA officials describe
themselves as “the gold standard” for drug review—more thorough and
rigorous about regulation than their counterparts in other countries18—
and, until recently, able to fulfill their core institutional mandates
without the cooperation of foreign counterparts. We argue that the
implementation of the first U.S. mutual recognition agreement (“MRA”)
with the EU, after a twenty-year delay, finally occurred due to changes
in global pharmaceutical production that forced the FDA to
acknowledge its inability to fulfill its mandate on good manufacturing
practices (“GMP”) inspections alone.
Based on the foregoing analysis, Part IV outlines proposed
guidelines for issues on which the FDA is more likely to successfully
employ equivalence determinations as a means of international
regulatory engagement. Drawing on those general guidelines, we
15. See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 13, at 217 (arguing that where a single agency has
consolidated control over a policy matter at the domestic level, that agency is less willing to restrict
its policymaking discretion through international agreements).
16. See Daniel Carpenter, Reputation, Information and Confidence: The Political Economy of
Pharmaceutical Regulation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 399, 401
(Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (“The regulatory power of the FDA stems
from its reputation for scientific expertise and consumer protection.”).
17. See Belluck, supra note 11.
18. David A. Kessler, Remarks by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
207, 214–15 (1996); Richard A. Merrill, The Importance and Challenges of “Mutual Recognition,”
29 SETON HALL L. REV. 736, 742–43 (1998).
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explain in the final Part why the Trump Administration’s current effort
on prescription drug importation is likely to fail. We conclude by
suggesting a pathway for importing already-approved foreign versions
of U.S. medications without patent protection or other forms of
exclusivity but lacking insufficient generic competition. That pathway
would help prevent and reduce the duration of off-patent drug shortages
and price hikes, providing the context in which U.S. prescription drug
importation may finally succeed.
I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF U.S. PRESCRIPTION
DRUG IMPORTATION
There is nothing unusual about the use of imported
pharmaceuticals in the United States. The United States is already the
world’s largest importer of pharmaceuticals. At $97 billion in imports
in 2017, pharmaceutical imports represent roughly a quarter of the U.S.
pharmaceutical market.19 Outsourcing of the manufacturing of an
active pharmaceutical ingredient (“API”)20 and of finished drugs to
foreign contract manufacturers—particularly those in India, China,
and Eastern Europe—more than doubled between 2001 and 2010.21 The
FDA estimates that 80% of the APIs and 40% of the finished drugs used
in the United States are imported. 22 These estimates may be low,
however; a recent study found that 60% of finished drugs in the United
States and 90% or more of APIs were made at foreign facilities.23
The debate over imported medicines exists not because those
medicines are made abroad—most U.S. prescription drugs are. Rather,
19. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 2016 TOP MARKETS REPORT:
PHARMACEUTICALS 8 (2016) https://legacy.trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Pharmaceuticals_Top_Marke
ts_Reports.pdf [https://perma.cc/942E-DKML]; Thomas Bollyky & Aaron S. Kesselheim,
Pharmaceutical Protections in U.S. Trade Deals —What Do Americans Get in Return?, 380 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1993, 1994–95 (2019).
20. An active pharmaceutical ingredient (“API”), or bulk drug substance, is “any substance
that is intended for incorporation into a finished drug product and is intended to furnish
pharmacological activity or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body,” but does not include
intermediates used in the synthesis of the API. 21 C.F.R. § 207.1 (2019). Because an API is
intended to diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease, or to affect the structure or function
of the body according to this regulation, it meets the definition of a drug under the FDCA. See 21
U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2012) (defining the term “drug” to include any articles intended for use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease). Generally, an API undergoes
further manufacturing into a drug product, or finished dosage form, that contains the API and
excipients. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 210.3(b)(4) (2019) (defining the term drug product).
21. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PATHWAY TO GLOBAL PRODUCT SAFETY AND QUALITY 14
(2011); Ernst R. Berndt, Rena M. Conti & Stephen J. Murphy, The Generic Drug User Fee
Amendments: An Economic Perspective, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCE 103, 112 (2018).
22. Bollyky & Kesselheim, supra note 19, at 1993–94.
23. Berndt et al., supra note 21, at 117–18.
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such debate arises amid calls for the importation of prescription drugs
made for foreign markets and approved by other nations’ regulatory
authorities, such as Health Canada and European Medicines Agency
(“EMA”), not by the FDA. Public demand for this sort of prescription
drug import may arise when there are U.S. drug shortages or on
occasions when the FDA has not yet approved a medicine that patients
or physicians perceive as offering therapeutic benefits for an unmet
medical need. In recent years, however, the demand for prescription
drug importation has been driven mostly by price; foreign versions of
FDA-approved medicines are often cheaper and, therefore, are a
potential source of spending relief for U.S. patients unable to afford
their prescriptions.
A. U.S. Prescription Drug Spending
Average pharmaceutical prices for brand-name drugs are higher
in the United States than in other countries.24 The United States is
distinct among high-income countries in that it offers strong drug
patent protections and limits the ability of public and private payers to
appraise new drugs and bargain effectively for lower prices. This
combination leads companies to price their drugs at whatever the target
segment of the U.S. market will bear, rather than as a benchmark of
the drug’s therapeutic and economic value, underlying research and
development costs, or expected global revenues. In recent years, the
U.S. market has borne a lot.
While prescription drugs represented about 10% of U.S. health
care spending in the past, 25 they now comprise more than 16% of total
national health care expenditures.26 Prescription medication coverage

24. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of Prescription
Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 859 (2016); Robert
Langreth, Blacki Migliozzi & Ketaki Gokhale, The U.S. Pays a Lot More for Top Drugs than Other
Countries, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-drug-prices/
[https://perma.cc/5293-G6Y3].
25. Rabah Kamal, Cynthia Cox & Daniel McDermott, What Are the Recent and Forecasted
Trends in Prescription Drug Spending?, PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/recent-forecasted-trends-prescription-drugspending/#item-start [https://perma.cc/PL5U-U9NE].
26. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING
& EVALUATION, OBSERVATIONS ON TRENDS IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 1 (2016),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/pdf-report/observations-trends-prescription-drug-spending [https://perma.cc/
FY2F-6R9R]; Ernst R. Berndt, Rena M. Conti & Stephen J. Murphy, The Landscape of US Generic
Prescription Drug Markets, 2004-2016, at 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
23640, 2017) (noting that estimates of U.S. prescription drug spending should also include
prescription drugs used in the inpatient setting, since hospitals are commonly paid for such care
using bundled payment).
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constitutes 19% of employer-based insurance benefits,27 and one
commercial health plan with more than a million members recently
reported that prescription drugs comprised one-fourth of its health care
spending.28 In 2018, U.S. per capita spending on pharmaceuticals was
$1,229, nearly 50% more than in Canada and twice as much as that of
many European nations.29 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services predicts that Americans’ drug spending will increase to more
than $1,700 per person by 2026, at which time it will constitute
approximately one out of every five dollars Americans spend on
health care.30
B. The Current Pathways for Legally Permissible
U.S. Prescription Drug Importation
As U.S. patients’ spending on prescription drugs has risen, so
has the demand for cheaper imports. The channels for legal
importation, however, are limited, and U.S. health officials, especially
at the FDA, have historically opposed expanding those channels.
Prescription drugs made for foreign markets are unlikely to
comply with the requirements of the FDCA.31 The FDCA prohibits the
introduction into interstate commerce, including importation, of any
drug that is not the subject of an FDA-approved new drug application
(“NDA”) or, in the case of generic medicines, an abbreviated new drug
application (“ANDA”).32 FDA approvals are specific to the information
in the NDA or ANDA, including the manufacturer, product, and its use;
manufacturing location, formulation, source, and specifications of
active ingredients; processing methods; manufacturing controls;

27. Kesselheim et al., supra note 24, at 859.
28. Michael Sherman, Gregory D. Curfman, Jason Parent & Anita Katharina Wagner,
Prescription Medications Account for One in Four Dollars Spent by a Commercial Health Plan,
HEALTH AFF.: CONSIDERING HEALTH SPENDING (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20180821.820628/full/ [https://perma.cc/D8KN-MNG9?type=image].
29. Pharmaceutical Spending, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV., https://data.oecd.org/
healthres/pharmaceutical-spending.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2020) [https://perma.cc/92NYRZHZ] (use drop-down menus below the chart to select “US dollars/capita” to view spending
per capita).
30. See National Health Expenditure Projections 2017–26, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ACUTARY 17 (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/Research-StatisticsData-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/
NHEProjSlides.pdf [https://perma.cc/639T-SRKW] (noting that national health spending is
projected to reach $5.7 trillion by 2026).
31. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 1–901, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399i (2012); CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., supra note 10, at 10.
32. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 331(d), 355(a).
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labeling; and appearance.33 If a product is manufactured, packaged, or
labeled in any way that differs from the NDA—for example, it is made
in a different facility or according to different specifications or labeled
for sale in a different market—then the FDA considers that drug
unapproved,34 mislabeled,35 or adulterated,36 even if it is made by the
company that makes the FDA-approved version of the same drug.37
Further, the U.S. Prescription Drug Marketing Act forbids any
party other than the manufacturer from importing prescription drugs.38
This restriction means that even FDA-approved drugs manufactured in
FDA-approved facilities may not be imported by a party that is not the
original manufacturer.39 This restriction covers “re-imported”
medicines—prescription drugs manufactured in the United States or
abroad (in FDA-approved facilities) and sold in foreign markets subject
to their price controls and then imported back to the United States.40
There are currently three avenues for legal importation of
prescription drugs that are not approved by the FDA.41
First, the FDA has a formal policy of exercising discretion in its
enforcement activities when it comes to importation of prescription
drugs by patients themselves for personal use. Section 384(j) of the
FDCA gives the FDA “discretion to permit individuals to make . . .
importations [if]. . . the importation is clearly for personal use; and the
prescription drug or device imported does not appear to present an

33. Id. § 355(b)(1) (listing the information that must be contained in an application to approve
a new drug).
34. Id. § 355.
35. The labeling does not include the FDA-approved adequate directions for use. Id. §§ 352,
353(b)(2).
36. “Adulterated” means being held under insanitary conditions other than those FDAapproved. Id. § 351(a).
37. Letter from William K. Hubbard, Assoc. Comm’r for Policy & Planning, Food & Drug
Admin., to Robert P. Lombardi, Esq., The Kullman Firm 1 (Feb. 12, 2003) (“[E]ven if the
manufacturer has FDA approval for a drug, the version produced for foreign markets usually does
not meet all of the requirements of the U.S. approval, and thus it is considered to be unapproved.”).
See United States v. 1500 90-Tablet Bottles, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1218 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (ruling
that the drug at issue was an unapproved new drug because it did not meet the FDA-approved
NDA packaging requirement).
38. Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 § 3, 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1) (2012).
39. See id.; United States v. Genendo Pharm., N.V., 485 F.3d 958, 962–65 (7th Cir. 2007); In
re Can. Import Antitrust Litig., 470 F.3d 785, 789–90 (8th Cir. 2006).
40. The only scenario permitted is what is referred to as “American goods returned,” such as
when the original manufacturer shifts inventory from abroad back to the United States to sell on
the U.S. market. Erika Lietzan, Demystifying Drug Importation After Impression v. Lexmark,
PATENTLY0 (June 6, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/06/demystifying-importationimpression.html [https://perma.cc/65M2-UHVB].
41. For clarity, we note that these channels apply to both importation of unapproved
prescription drugs and “re-importation” of FDA-approved prescription drugs, as the FDA has
considered both to be unapproved. See 21 U.S.C. § 381(d); Lietzan, supra note 40.
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unreasonable risk to the individual.”42 The FDA adopted that policy
soon after the practice of personal importation became widespread
enough to gain public attention: when the People With AIDS Health
Group formed the first buyers’ club to import unapproved AIDS drugs
for its members in the United States in 1987.43 A modest portion of U.S.
citizens currently travel to Canada, Mexico, or other foreign countries
to purchase lower-priced prescription drugs.44
The current version of that FDA policy requires that the
imported product be for a serious condition with no effective treatment
available domestically, citing as an example a situation in which a
patient has initiated treatment abroad with a non-FDA-approved
drug.45 The quantity should not exceed a three months’ supply. 46 There
must be no subsequent commercial sales or promotion of the imported
drug in the United States. 47 On request, the patient should provide to
FDA personnel the name and address of the U.S.-licensed physician
responsible for treatment.48 Decisions on personal use are based on the
discretion of the FDA, and the FDA may change its policies on personal
use at any time.49 The personal use policy does not alter the FDCA or
create an individual right to import unapproved drugs.50 FDA guidance
also makes clear that “the [personal use exemption] is not intended to

42. 21 U.S.C. § 384(j)(1)(B) (2012).
43. Paula Span, Pharmacy for the Desperate: AIDS Drug Buyers’ Clubs, Dispensing Untested
Hope, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1992, at D1. See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 21, at 9–
21 (detailing the FDA’s personal importation policy).
44. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: November 2016, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 17 (Nov.
2016),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Kaiser-Health-Tracking-Poll-November-2016-Topline
[https://perma.cc/Q4BF-JHME].
45. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 21, at 9–24.
46. Id. at 9–23.
47. See id. (noting that the personal importation policy does not apply to commercial and
promotional shipments).
48. See id. at 9–24 (stating that more permissive decisions may be considered when the
individual provides such information).
49. See id. at 9–23 (explaining that all products in violation of statutes administered by
FDA are subject to refusal, but the FDA may use discretion to allow admission of certain
violative items).
50. Personal Importation Policy (PIP) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. 1, https://www.fda.gov/media/83411/download [https://perma.cc/U4Z7-92RS] (stressing
that the personal importation policy should not be interpreted as a license to individuals to bring
in such shipments). Courts have upheld the position of the FDA on personal use, finding that there
is no individual right under either the Constitution, the FDCA, or the Regulatory Procedures
Manual to import drugs, approved or otherwise. See Benten v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084, 1084–85
(1992) (upholding the personal use policy and supporting the confiscation of RU-486 imported for
personal use in inducing a non-surgical abortion); see also Peter S. Reichertz & Melinda S. Friend,
Hiding Behind Agency Discretion: The Food and Drug Administration’s Personal Use Drug
Importation Policy, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 494 (2000) (describing the FDA’s personal
use importation policy).
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permit personal importation of cheaper versions of FDA approved drugs
from . . . foreign countries.”51
The second channel for importing unapproved versions of
prescription drugs enables the HHS secretary to respond to medical
emergencies or drug shortages.52 The secretary is required to maintain
a list of U.S. drug shortages,53 which the FDA defines as a drug for
which the demand or projected demand for a drug in the United States
exceeds the supply.54 The secretary is required to estimate the duration
of the shortage, and the FDCA, as amended by the FDA Safety and
Innovation Act (“FDASIA”) of 2012, enables the secretary to authorize
that specific drug’s importation during that shortage.55 The FDA has
facilitated temporary importation of foreign versions of FDA-approved
drugs during shortages of essential medicines that could not be resolved
by manufacturers of the FDA-approved drugs.56 The FDA focuses on
shortages of medically necessary products that have a critical effect on
public health, and authorizations of importation through this pathway
have generally been temporary.57
In 2003, Congress created a third channel, which empowers the
secretary of HHS to permit wholesalers and pharmacists to import
prescription drugs from Canada for the purpose of lowering U.S. drug
costs.58 Section 804 of the MMA amended the FDCA to allow
51. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 50, at 1.
52. 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1)-(2) (2012).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 356e (2012).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 356c(h)(2); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., MAPP 4190.1 Rev. 3, DRUG SHORTAGE MANAGEMENT 14 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/
media/72447/download [https://perma.cc/9P9E-43ZA].
55. See 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(2).
56. Frequently Asked Questions: Temporary Importation of Lipodox, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.
1
(2012),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugShortages/
UCM295225.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BRN-3UND].
57. AMANDA K. SARATA & AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IFI 1056,
PRESCRIPTION
DRUG
IMPORTATION
2
(2019),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/IF/IF11056 [https://perma.cc/DZ39-D36X]. See, e.g., Zachary Brennan, FDA Allows
Temporary Saline Imports to Deal With Shortages Caused by Hurricane Maria, REG. AFF. PROFS.
SOC’Y: REG. FOCUS (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%E2%84%A2/newsarticles/2017/10/fda-allows-temporary-saline-imports-to-deal-with-shortages-caused-byhurricane-maria [https://perma.cc/JTM9-QSB9] (discussing the FDA’s temporary authorization of
imports after Hurricane Maria); FDA Approves Temporary Import of Hydromorphone
Hydrochloride Injection, AM. HOSP. ASS’N (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.aha.org/
news/headline/2018-08-24-fda-approves-temporary-import-hydromorphone-hydrochlorideinjection [https://perma.cc/52EB-R6YW]. On July, 24, 2020, President Trump issued an executive
order instructing the HHS secretary to permit re-importation of insulin upon a finding by the
secretary that insulin is required for emergency medical care. Exec. Order No. 13,938, 85 Fed. Reg.
45,757 (July 24, 2020). At the time of writing, the HHS secretary had not announced any finding
that insulin qualifies as emergency medical care.
58. See 21 U.S.C. § 384 (2012) (directing the HHS Secretary to adopt regulations allowing
pharmacists and wholesalers to import drugs from Canada as long as certain requirements are
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importation, but the amendment comes with conditions and
requirements.59 The secretary must certify to Congress that
implementation “will pose no additional risk to the public’s health and
safety; and result in a significant reduction in the cost of covered
products to the American consumer.”60 If the secretary so certifies, other
statutory requirements must be met: the drugs may be imported only
from Canada and must be foreign versions of already FDA-approved
drugs, labeled according to FDA requirements, and not misbranded or
adulterated.61 There are also requirements for strict laboratory testing
and recordkeeping, as well as prohibitions on the importation of
controlled substances, biological products, infused drugs, intravenously
injected drugs, and drugs inhaled during surgery.62 If those statutory
requirements are met, HHS must promulgate regulations as necessary
to implement the program.
In sixteen years, no HHS secretary has made the necessary
certifications, so the MMA importation pathway has never been used.
Each of the last four FDA commissioners has said there would be no
way to ensure the safety of U.S. prescription drug imports from
Canada.63 When asked about the failure to implement this
provision during his 2014 confirmation hearing, then-nominee Robert
Califf stated:
Drugs from foreign sources that are not FDA-approved nor have such an inspection do not
have the assurance of safety, effectiveness, and quality as drugs subject to FDA
oversight. . . . FDA would not be able to make safety and quality determinations for
prescription drugs offered for import into the United States that have not gone through
the U.S. regulatory process. 64

In other words, U.S. health officials are unwilling to rely on the
good manufacturing practices and inspections that Health Canada
conducts or to declare that agency’s oversight as equivalent to the
met). This legislation came after years of proposed bills and one failed prior attempt to create a
pathway for legal importation of foreign-approved pharmaceuticals. See Wesley J. Heath,
America’s First Drug Regulation Regime: The Rise and Fall of the Import Drug Act of 1848, 59
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 169, 179–81 (2004) (describing the Import Drug Act of 1848, which was
Congress’s first attempt to address the challenge of imported, adulterated drugs); Daniel L.
Pollock, Blame Canada (and the Rest of the World): The Twenty-Year War on Imported Prescription
Drugs, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331, 356–67 (2006) (describing the early history of state and
federal legislative initiatives to establish importation as a means to lower U.S. drug prices).
59. 21 U.S.C. § 384.
60. Id. § 384(l)(1).
61. Id. § 384.
62. Id. § 384(a), (d), (e).
63. Alex M. Azar II, U.S. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., Remarks on Drug Pricing
Blueprint (May 14, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/leadership/secretary/speeches/2018speeches/remarks-on-drug-pricing-blueprint.html [https://perma.cc/4Q6K-735E].
64. Nomination of Robert Califf to Serve as FDA Commissioner: Hearing of the S. Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 114th Cong. 82 (2015) (statement of nominee Robert Califf).
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FDA’s, even for versions of FDA-approved drugs with the other MMA
recordkeeping and testing requirements. Without that equivalency
determination and reliance on Health Canada, the FDA would have to
establish its own inspection and screening processes for these particular
prescription drug imports. In the past, U.S. officials have concluded,
and the Congressional Budget Office’s estimates have confirmed, that
doing so would be prohibitively expensive, overwhelming any cost
savings from the imported drugs’ lower prices.65
C. Recent Efforts to Expand U.S. Prescription Drug Importation
Members of Congress have introduced numerous bills, some
with bipartisan support, to create additional channels for U.S.
prescription drug imports or broaden existing channels.66 Amid
industry and HHS opposition, none of these bills have yet been enacted.
For its part, Canada, which has a population about 11% of that of the
United States, has expressed concern about the effect that U.S.
wholesaler purchases would have on the Canadian drug supply
and prices.67
On December 18, 2019, HHS Secretary Alex Azar announced an
NPRM to authorize two-year state, tribal, or territorial government
demonstration projects that fulfill the requirements of section 804 of
the MMA.68 Non-federal government entities that intend to sponsor one
65. COLIN BAKER, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, WOULD PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION REDUCE
U.S. DRUG SPENDING? 3, 5 (2004), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/108th-congress-20032004/reports/04-29-prescriptiondrugs.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GTN-NUFW]; CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., supra note 10, at 2–3; HHS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMP., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., REPORT ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION 65 (2004), http://www.safemedicines.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/03/HHS-Report1220.pdf [https://perma.cc/ESG8-4YZT].
66. See, e.g., S. Amendment 178 to S. Con. Res. 3, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposed amendment
to allow parallel importation of drugs from Canada); Prescription Drug Affordability Act of 2015,
S. 2023, 114th Cong. (2015) (bill that would, among other things, allow the HHS secretary to
negotiate lower prices for drugs covered by Medicare Part D); Pharmaceutical Market Access and
Drug Safety Act of 2009, S. 525, 111th Cong. (2009) (bill that would allow greater personal and
commercial importation of prescription drugs); see also Michael Fralick, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S.
Kesselheim, The Price of Crossing the Border for Medications, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 311, 312
(2017) (noting that legislative attempts to authorize broader importation of Canadian drugs have
never gained traction at the state or federal level).
67. Allison Martell, Exclusive: Canada Warns U.S. Against Drug Import Plans, Citing
Shortage Concerns, REUTERS (July 18, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-canadapharmaceuticals-exports-exclus/exclusive-canada-warns-us-against-drug-import-plans-citingshortage-concerns-idUSKCN1UD2LN [https://perma.cc/29BE-Y4GJ].
68. Importation of Prescription Drugs, 84 Fed. Reg. 70,796, 70,797 (proposed Dec. 23, 2019)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 251); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 3. The
NPRM includes another pathway to allow manufacturers themselves to “import versions of FDAapproved drug products that they sell in foreign countries that are the same as the U.S. versions,”
but using a new National Drug Code (NDC) to allow those manufacturers to use those imported
products as a means of voluntarily cutting their prices without breaching existing supply contracts.
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of these projects may submit a project proposal for FDA approval.
Among other requirements, those proposals must explain how the
intended projects would pose no additional risk to public health and
safety and would result in a significant reduction in prescription drug
costs to U.S. consumers.69 On July 24, 2020, President Trump issued an
executive order instructing the HHS Secretary to complete this
rulemaking process.70 On September 24, 2020, the FDA issued the final
rule establishing a pathway for states (or other identified parties) to set
up their own time-limited program to import prescription drugs from
Canada.71 The rule is scheduled to go into effect on November 24, after
the U.S. presidential election.72
The legal and practical obstacles are likely to prevent the final
rule from succeeding in its current form. First, the rule requires the
direct participation and cooperation of the manufacturer, which, in
most cases, will not favor the importation of lower-cost versions of its
prescription drug products.73 Proposals must specify the
pharmaceuticals intended for import, and the foreign seller (which
must be both licensed by Health Canada as a wholesaler and pre-

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Safe Importation Action Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 1
(July
31,
2019),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/safe-importation-action-plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CV3A-YNPJ].
69. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 68, at 1.
70. Exec. Order 13938, 85 Fed. Reg. 45,757 (Jul. 24, 2020). The executive order also includes
two other provisions that appear as if they facilitate importation, but in actuality these provisions
largely restate existing statutory authorities. First, the executive order instructs the HHS
secretary to exercise the discretion already provided in 21 U.S.C. § 384(j)(1) in enforcement
activities against individuals importing prescription drugs for personal use, provided it “poses no
additional risk to public safety.” The December 2019 NPRM indicated, however, FDA was not
amenable to implementing the personal importation provisions in section 804(j) because of the risk
that unscrupulous online Canadian pharmacies pose to public safety. 84 Fed. Reg. at 70,797–98.
Second, the executive order also instructs the HHS secretary to permit re-importation of insulin
upon a finding by the secretary that insulin is required for emergency medical care, an authority
which the secretary already possessed since 1997 under 21 U.S.C. § 381(d).
71. Importation of Prescription Drugs, Final Rule (Sept. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 251), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/importation-final-rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9LA8-HDCB] (at the time of writing, the final rule has not yet been published in the
Federal Register).
72. Id.
73. The HHS contends “multiple manufacturers have stated (either publicly or in statements
to the Administration) that they wanted to offer lower-cost versions [of their drugs] but could not
readily do so because they were locked into contracts with other parties in the supply chain.” U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 68, at 3. It is not clear why those supply chain contracts would
not permit a manufacturer to offer low-cost medicines if imported from abroad or why this
approach would be preferable to releasing an authorized, lower-cost generic version of the product
as some generic companies have done. Lydia Ramsey Pflanzer, The $300 Generic Epipen Is Here,
BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/mylan-launches-authorizedgeneric-epipen-for-300-2016-12 [https://perma.cc/G9PC-FC6Q].
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registered with the FDA as a foreign seller) must purchase eligible
prescription drugs directly from the manufacturer.74
Second, the HHS secretary made the certification required for
importation under section 804(l)(1) in conjunction with the issuance of
the final rule, but that certification is conditional on the sponsor
ensuring that the project will result in a significant reduction in the cost
to the American consumer.75 As the FDA itself concedes, it is unclear
how a sponsor can establish prior to importation that the anticipated
savings of importing will exceed the anticipated costs and that those
savings will go directly to consumers, as is required by section 804 of
the MMA.76 This challenge is intensified by the complex importation
requirements proposed in the rule, which would increase importation
costs, and by the exclusion from eligibility of biologics and other more
expensive drugs, which would lower the potential financial rewards
of importation.77
74. Importation of Prescription Drugs, 84 Fed. Reg. at 70,797–98.
75. The final rule “requires the . . . Sponsor’s importation plan to explain, in a manner
sufficiently detailed to allow for a meaningful evaluation, how the Sponsor will ensure that the
[project] will result in a significant reduction in the cost to the American consumer.” See
Importation of Prescription Drugs, Final Rule #2020-199, at 69 (Sept. 24, 2020) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 251), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/importation-final-rule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9LA8-HDCB] (at the time of writing, the final rule has not yet been published in
the Federal Register). In response to the NPRM, several commentators argued that section 804(1)
requires a factual finding that cost savings would result from the project before certification can
be made. See id. at 68; Rachel E. Sachs & Nicholas Bagley, Importing Prescription Drugs from
Canada — Legal and Practical Problems with the Trump Administration’s Proposal, 382 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1777, 1778 (2020).
76. The FDA’s preliminary regulatory impact analysis of NPRM indicated it is an open
question “as to whether this proposed rule could yield non-zero benefits.” See U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., PRELIMINARY REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ANALYSIS & UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT ANALYSIS, DOCKET NO. FDA-2019-N-5711,
9 (2020).
77. See Importation of Prescription Drugs, Final Rule #2020-199. To be eligible for
importation under the final rule the drug must be approved by Health Canada and, other than
labeling, satisfy the requirements of an FDA-approved NDA or ANDA. The importer must submit
a Pre-Import Request to the FDA at least thirty days prior to the scheduled date of entry; the
request must include the importer’s plan for testing the imported drugs for authenticity,
degradation, and compliance with established FDA specifications and standards. Id. at 138 (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 251.5). Before an imported drug can be sold in the United States, the FDA
must review and find those testing results acceptable, and the product must meet FDCA labeling
requirements and comply with the Drug Supply Chain Security Act requirements. Id. at 162–66
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 251.16-17). Sponsors will need to comply with post-importation
requirements, including providing the FDA with an accounting of the cost savings to American
consumers. Id. at 167 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 251.18). On September 25, the Centers of
Medicare and Medicaid Services issued guidance that prescription drugs imported through this
pathway would not be eligible for Medicare rebates programs, including its “best price” policy,
further diminishing the potential cost savings. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
CMS GUIDANCE TO THE STATES ON THE FDA FINAL REGULATION “IMPORTATION OF PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS” RELATED TO SECTION 804 OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (FFDCA) AND
THE MEDICAID DRUG REBATE PROGRAM (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.medicaid.gov/prescriptiondrugs/downloads/state-rel-187.pdf [https://perma.cc/2449-8QMQ].
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Third, Health Canada will likely undertake measures to thwart
implementation of the system proposed. Importation of alreadymarketed prescription drugs would reduce their availability to
Canadian patients and give manufacturers an incentive to raise prices
of importation-eligible drugs in Canada. In response to the issuance of
the NPRM, the Government of Canada submitted a comment opposing
the proposal, promising that “Canada will employ all necessary
measures to safeguard its drug supply and preserve access for
Canadians to needed prescription drugs.”78
II. ROLE OF REPUTATION AND CONSOLIDATED AUTHORITY
IN EQUIVALENCE DETERMINATIONS
Importation of prescription drugs, even foreign, unapproved
versions of already FDA-approved drugs, inherently involves the
question of whether the importing nations are willing to accept and rely
on the equivalence of the standards, processes, and product-specific
decisions of the exporting nations. The good news for those who favor
U.S. prescription drug importation is that equivalence determinations
are an established form of international regulatory engagement. The
theory and practice of such arrangements may be drawn on to identify
circumstances in which U.S. prescription drug importation is more
likely to succeed.
Equivalence determinations are decisions to recognize and
accept foreign regulation as equivalent to and as an adequate substitute
for domestic regulation.79 These equivalence determinations come in
different forms.80 Some determinations are formal, reciprocal, and
memorialized in a binding agreement, such as an MRA.81 Others are
78. Gov’t of Can., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Importation of Prescription Drugs
(Docket No. FDA-2019-N-5711) (Mar. 8, 2020), https://beta.regulations.gov/comment/FDA-2019N-5711-1208 [https://perma.cc/FYP9-NKTR].
79. Merill, supra note 18, at 754.
80. Some use the term “equivalence determination” only to refer to unilateral equivalent
determinations, but we adopt the view, as others have, that MRAs are functionally formal,
bilateral equivalence determinations. See, e.g., id. at 751–54 (laying out the various models that
these agreements can follow); John C. Reitz, Recognition of Foreign Administrative Acts, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. 589, 595–96 (2014) (noting that an equivalency determination is essentially an informal
form of an MRA); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative
Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 66 (2005) (“[P]ractice might often blur the distinction
between adoption of [a] common standard[ ] by . . . government regulators and mutual recognition
arrangements and equivalence practices by such regulators.”).
81. See, e.g., Agreement on Mutual Recognition Between the European Community and the
United States of America, 1999 O.J. (L 31) (an example of a formal mutual recognition agreement).
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) countries, which include Brunei
Darussalam, Singapore, and Vietnam, established a Consultative Committee on Standards and
Quality (ACCSQ) and adopted the 1998 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Mutual Recognition
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informal and unilateral, and may take the form of one regulator
exercising enforcement discretion to monitor less closely the imported
goods and services overseen by another nation’s regulatory bodies,
which the importing nation’s regulator has judged to be reliable.82 In
some cases, the determination of equivalence involves a combination of
these elements, with a regulator unilaterally making a formal
determination to accept the certification of a foreign regulator as the
functional equivalent to the inspection and certification of the domestic
regulator.83 Arrangements have also evolved from less formal unilateral
equivalence determinations to reciprocal and more formal bilateral or
plurilateral arrangements, such as an MRA.84 An equivalence
determination can encompass the substantive standards of a foreign
regulator or be limited to accepting the determination of the foreign
regulator or a third-party certifier that the imported good or service
conforms to the importing nation’s standards.85
Accepting and relying on the standards and decisionmaking of a
foreign counterpart is not an easy decision for a regulatory agency. As
Daniel Carpenter argues, regulators like the FDA depend on the
confidence of their constituents—their reputation—for their funding
and authority.86 In the United States and most other nations,
pharmaceutical regulators operate as gatekeepers, exercising
administrative discretion in granting premarket approval to new
pharmaceutical products and seeking to prevent harm to consumers.
Before approval, regulators must have confidence that the benefits of a
candidate prescription drug exceed its risks and that quality of
production is sufficient and reliable. Similarly, the constituents of that
regulator—appropriators, consumers, product sponsors, and the

Arrangements in order to promote an ambitious agenda of regional cooperation on standards,
technical regulations, and conformity assessment. In 1998, Australia and New Zealand entered
into the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement, which operates to facilitate trade in
goods irrespective of differences in standards or other sale-related regulatory requirements. See
Debra P. Steger, Institutions for Regulatory Cooperation in ‘New Generation’ Economic and Trade
Agreements, 39 LEGAL I SSUES ECON. I NTEGRATION 109, 115–16 (2012) (discussing the TransTasman MRA).
82. Merrill, supra note 18, at 751–52.
83. Anabela Correia de Brito, Céline Kauffmann & Jacques Pelkmans, The Contribution of
Mutual Recognition to International Regulatory Co-operation 16, 24 (Org. Econ. Co-operation &
Dev. Regulatory Policy, Working Paper No. 2, 2016), https://www.oecd.org/regreform/
WP2_Contribution-of-mutual-recognition-to-IRC.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B3U-8U8J].
84. See Tzung-bor Wei, The Equivalence Approach to Securities Regulation, 27 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 255, 295 (2007) (“Equivalence no longer means unilateral action; instead, like mutual
recognition, it is conditioned on reciprocity.”).
85. Correia de Brito et al., supra note 83, at 16, 24.
86. See Carpenter, supra note 16, at 401 (“The regulatory power of the FDA stems from its
reputation for scientific expertise and consumer protection.”).
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relevant medical and scientific communities—must have confidence in
its regulatory oversight.
This dynamic is apparent in successful international
equivalence determinations, as the factors that all such determinations
share are that they gain and maintain the confidence of (a) the
participating regulators and (b) those regulators’ domestic constituents.
Making an ex ante determination that another regulator’s
decisionmaking or inspections will be equivalent and reliable requires
a high degree of trust supported by intensive information-sharing
concerning the foreign regulator’s standards and procedures.87
Especially on matters of public health and safety, reaching that level of
confidence may not be possible with regard to nations with less
stringent regulatory authorities and histories of corruption. Even
among like-minded nations of similar economic development,
regulatory differences are inevitable. Regulation starts out as the
answer to a domestic problem, developed within a pre-existing, national
regulatory framework. While the social preferences and attitudes
toward risk may be similar in two countries, their governments may
still devise different rules and enforce them differently because of each
country’s particular institutional structures and rulemaking
procedures.88 Monitoring another nation’s adoption of equivalent laws
and regulations is feasible, but ensuring the consistency of
interpretation and enforcement is harder.89
The second set of challenges involves gaining and maintaining
the confidence of domestic constituents in international regulatory
arrangements. Policy independence and regulatory sovereignty were
among the reasons (along with anti-immigration sentiments) cited by
those voting in favor of the United Kingdom’s June 2016 referendum to
exit the European Union (“EU”).90 Even outside such polarized political

87. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J.
55, 96 (2011).
88. DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
REGIMES 48–50 (2007); see, e.g., Bamberger & Guzman, supra note 12, at 1424–26 (noting that
U.S. officials have argued against prescription drug imports using the example that Japanese law
allows the export of expired medical products whereas the U.S. law does not).
89. See Linda R. Horton & Kathleen E. Hastings, A Plan that Establishes a Framework for
Achieving Mutual Recognition of Good Manufacturing Practices Inspections, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
527, 531 (1998) (stating that before the FDA accepts enforcement methods of foreign governments
as equivalent, it needs assurance that such activities provide the same level of product quality,
safety, and efficacy); Reitz, supra note 80, at 596–97 (noting that MRAs “require a very high level
of confidence in the foreign regulators and their regulations and a significant educational effort
during which the regulators from the participating countries learn about each other’s methods
and standards”).
90. Dreaming of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST (Mar. 19, 2016), https://www.economist.com/
britain/2016/03/19/dreaming-of-sovereignty [https://perma.cc/ATC4-NDGZ].
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environments, constituents have had concerns regarding the
transparency, accountability, and democratic legitimacy of
international
regulatory
arrangements
and
networks.91
Determinations of equivalence and reliance arrangements may
circumvent administrative law procedures, such as notice-andcomment rulemaking, that seek to ensure public participation in the
process of promulgating administrative regulations. 92
These twin challenges in achieving confidence in international
regulatory cooperation are particularly manifest in the pharmaceutical
sector. Prescription drugs are among the most extensively regulated
consumer products; in most countries, governments regulate testing,
development, production, marketing, and liability, and, in some cases,
even control distribution and prices.93 Deviation from rigorous
regulatory oversight can lead to unsafe products that cause harm or
death. There is a higher expectation regarding medicines’ safety than
with most other consumer products; we consume them and give them
to our children and elderly at times when their well-being is at risk.
Regulators naturally also want to avoid the political outcry that would
accompany harm caused by an unsafe drug that had been approved
based on the decision or inspection of a foreign regulator.94
Nonetheless, international equivalence determinations and
reliance arrangements in the pharmaceutical sector have increasingly
been used by nations in two particular contexts. First, pharmaceutical
regulatory equivalence and reliance determinations are used in trade
initiatives to reduce duplicative or unnecessarily divergent standards
and conformity assessment procedures. Second, regulatory equivalence
determinations have been deployed in the pharmaceutical sector out of
necessity when regulatory agencies have been unable to fulfill their core
institutional mandate without relying on the cooperative efforts of their
91. See Vivien A. Schmidt, The Eurozone’s Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy: Can the EU
Rebuild Public Trust and Support for European Economic Integration? 10 (European Comm’n
Directorate-Gen. of Econ. & Fin. Affairs, European Econ. Discussion Paper No. 15, Sept. 2015),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/dp015_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AUZ-F4PV].
92. Democratic legitimacy and accountability of international regulatory arrangements have
been the primary occupations of global administrative law, a subfield that has emerged to track
the processes, procedures, and substantive outcomes of international regulatory regimes. See, e.g.,
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 55 (2005) (noting that when transnational governance
institutions take over national administrative functions, domestic law safeguards like notice-andcomment procedures may erode); Jason Marisam, The Internationalization of Agency Actions, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 1909, 1912 (2015) (defining the focus of global administrative law as being the
processes, procedures, and substantive outcomes of international regulatory regimes).
93. Kai P. Purnhagen, The Challenge of Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law—Is an
International Drug Approval System Modeled After the European System Worth Considering?, 63
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 623, 624 (2008).
94. Id. at 628.
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foreign counterparts. Equivalence determinations have been used more
often in the former context than the latter, but the trade initiatives have
also been more dependent on a supporting architecture to succeed and
slower to win the confidence of regulators and domestic constituents.
A. Equivalence Determinations in International Trade
The use of equivalence determinations has increased in
international trade in response to a shift in the global production of
goods and services. In the 1960s, international companies began taking
advantage of lower tariffs, the containerization of shipping, and better
information and communication technologies to outsource parts of their
manufacturing supply chains to lower-cost, specialist suppliers
abroad.95 In the 1990s and 2000s, the use of these global supply chains
expanded to services and sectors ranging from food production to
medical research and development to pharmaceutical manufacturing.96
In these unbundled global supply chains, intermediate parts and
services may crisscross national borders multiple times, dramatically
increasing the volume of trade.97 The unbundling of the production of
goods and services into components and stages also reduces the barriers
for lower-income countries with nascent regulatory systems to
participate in the global production of goods and services and to
compete in the world economy.
The rise of global supply chains has increased the importance of
regulation in international trade. As the number of countries and
transactions in supply chains has multiplied, so have the costs of
excessive, duplicative, or unnecessarily divergent regulations.98 For

95. See generally MARC LEVINSON, THE BOX: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE
WORLD SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER 5 (Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 2016)
(discussing how containerization lowered shipping costs, made capital more mobile, and increased
the integration of the global economy); Thomas J. Bollyky & Petros C. Mavroidis, A Time for
Action: WTO Must Change to Promote Regulatory Cooperation, in BEHIND-THE-BORDER POLICIES:
ASSESSING AND ADDRESSING NON-TARIFF MEASURES 320–21 (Joseph Francois & Bernard
Hoekman eds., 2019); Richard Baldwin, Trade and Industrialization after Globalization’s Second
Unbundling: How Building and Joining a Supply Chain Are Different and Why It Matters 6 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17716, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17716
[https://perma.cc/7CCZ-BMK9] (“The ICT revolution made it feasible to spatially separate some
stages of production without much loss in efficiency or timeliness.”).
96. See Gary Gereffi, A Global Value Chain Perspective on Industrial Policy and Development
in Emerging Markets, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 433, 439 (2014) (discussing how starting in the
1990s, suppliers in low- and middle-income countries upgraded their infrastructure and
capabilities to be able to handle orders for more complex goods).
97. Thomas J. Bollyky, Better Regulation for Freer Trade, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 2 (June
19, 2012), https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2012/06/Policy_Innovation_Memo22_Bollyky.p
df [https://perma.cc/26QV-BCSB].
98. Id.
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regulators, the shift in global production has meant that their
institutional mandates to advance public goods—such as stemming
climate change, containing financial crises, or reducing pollution—and
achieve other regulatory objectives can no longer be met without
international coordination with their regulatory counterparts. 99 In
many sectors, sustaining regulatory oversight in one country depends
on the ability to rely on the adequacy and consistency of regulatory
oversight in other countries.100
The creation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1994
established new agreements that promote the acceptance of
international standards, transparency, and equivalence determinations
in regulations for industrial and agricultural products 101 as well as
measures that protect human and animal health and the environment
from pests and diseases.102 With the advent of the WTO, equivalence
99. See Thomas J. Bollyky & Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade, Social Preferences and Regulatory
Cooperation: The New WTO-Think, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 12 (2017) (noting that regulatory
cooperation not only enhances trade but can also help achieve regulatory goals more efficiently);
Alan O. Sykes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Service
Markets, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49, 70 (1999) (“[W]hen matters of domestic regulation implicate
important crossborder spillovers (chlorofluorocarbons and the ozone layer, for example), it is
undeniable that international co-operation is desirable to address the problem.”).
100. See Thomas J. Bollyky, Regulatory Coherence in the TPP Talks, in THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT 171 (Chin Leng Lim,
Deborah Elms & Patrick Low eds., 2012) (noting that stronger cooperation and inter-governmental
coordination is necessary to oversee increasingly complex production chains); Thomas J. Bollyky,
A Role for the World Trade Organization on Regulatory Coherence, E15 INITIATIVE 3 (2015),
https://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Regulatory-Coherence-BollykyFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4EY-UADR] (noting that with food, drugs, and consumer goods,
success depends on the consistency, adequacy, and predictability of regulatory oversight across
national boundaries).
101. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”) establishes rules and procedures
regarding the development, adoption, and application of standards and regulations for industrial
and agricultural products and the procedures (such as testing or certification) used to determine
whether a particular product meets those standards or regulation. The TBT is likely to cover most
pharmaceutical regulation. The TBT Agreement recommends performance- over process-based
measures because there may be gains from having different approaches to meet regulatory
objectives. The TBT Agreement includes a mix of legally binding obligations (like obligations to
notify and explain national regulations) and a best efforts requirement to pursue mutual
recognition, equivalency, and harmonization initiatives with other WTO members. See Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2.1-2.2, 2.5-2.8, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
102. The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (“SPS”) covers measures protecting
human and animal health and the environment from pests and diseases. It was included in the
WTO, in part, to guard against the EU reintroducing its common agricultural policy through
regulation. PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE WTO
AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN GOODS 455 (2016). It goes further than the TBT Agreement in requiring
that “Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as
equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own . . ., if the exporting Member objectively
demonstrates . . . that its measures achieve the importing Member’s appropriate level of . . .
protection.” The SPS Agreement also requires WTO members to adopt science-based measures and
be consistent in formulating their policies. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures art. 2.2-2.3, 4.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493.
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determinations and reliance arrangements began to emerge in wideranging areas such as competition, telecommunication and electrical
goods, environmental issues, finance, and pharmaceuticals.103 Many
such arrangements are connected to trade agreements or driven by
economic blocs, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(“APEC”).104 Some agreements go further to establish more robust
institutional mechanisms to foster regulatory cooperation,
harmonization, and mutual recognition of regulations, standards, and
conformity assessment procedures.105
There is strong evidence of the economic benefits of these
equivalence determinations and reliance arrangements. According to a
2011 WTO assessment, for example, those preferential trade
agreements that commit to “deep” integration on reducing technical
barriers to trade have lasting and substantial benefits for global supply
chains, increasing trade between participating countries by almost
8%.106 As a result, multinational companies and their business
associations have pressed for deeper international regulatory
cooperation arrangements in trade agreements to increase the
interoperability and efficiency of their suppliers and subsidiaries. 107
There is less evidence that the current trade-driven approaches
to equivalence determinations in international trade initiatives have
won the confidence of regulators and consumers. Most of the
equivalence determinations in trade agreements focus on reducing
duplicative conformity assessments and testing.108 These changes,
however, have not inspired much reliance from regulators in the
processes and substantive decisionmaking of their counterparts.109 For
103. See Silja Baller, Trade Effects of Regional Standards Liberalization: A Heterogenous
Firms Approach 34–35 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4124, February 2007),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/7156/WP04124.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Z8N-UTUN] (listing various categories of products covered by Mutual
Recognition Agreements between MRA partner jurisdictions).
104. Bollyky, supra note 100, at 177–78; WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2011, at
53, 190 (2011), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9VM-63QT].
105. Steger, supra note 81, at 109. See generally Richard Baldwin, Simon Evenett & Patrick
Low, Beyond Tariffs: Multilateralizing Non-Tariff RTA Commitments, in MULTILATERALIZING
REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 79 (Richard Baldwin & Patrick Low
eds., 2009) (discussing TBT provisions in PTAs that might be multilateralized at the WTO level).
106. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 104, at 44, 146; see also Correia de Brito et al., supra note
83, at 42–45 (examining the presence of equivalence and mutual recognition provisions in regional
trade agreements).
107. Paul Mertenskötter & Richard B. Stewart, Remote Control: Treaty Requirements for
Regulatory Procedures, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 165, 169–70 (2018).
108. See Correia de Brito et al., supra note 83, at 26.
109. See Elizabeth Golberg, Regulatory Cooperation – A Reality Check 31(Harvard MossavarRahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t Assoc. Working Paper No. 115, 2019), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/

2 - Bollyky & Kesselheim_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

1356

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

10/13/2020 4:21 PM

[Vol. 73:5:1331

example, there are fourteen MRAs involving pharmaceuticals.110 Most
of these MRAs are limited to the inspection of good manufacturing or
laboratory practices, and some are arrangements in which the
exporting state certifies that the inspection met the standard of the
importing state, rather than a determination that the participating
states’ inspection standards and processes are equivalent.111
Additionally, the deepening regulatory arrangements proposed in
negotiations of the (now) eleven-nation Comprehensive Trans-Pacific
Partnership and the stalled Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership were condemned by some civil society and consumer groups
as undemocratic, unrelated to trade, and likely to spur a regulatory race
to the bottom.112
It is possible that these trade-related equivalence
determinations may be advancing regulatory objectives as well as
producing economic returns, but few empirical assessments have
sought to determine whether that has indeed been the case. 113 Most
existing MRAs, pharmaceutical or otherwise, have had little, if
anything, to do with managing global risks. 114 That said, there is
anecdotal evidence that the intense exchange of information required
to conclude an equivalence determination has helped regulators
identify shortcomings and inefficiencies in their systems and improve
interoperability between national systems. 115 More evidence of the
work-sharing benefits of equivalence arrangements on inspections may

sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/img/115_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3A8T-TVRZ] (listing the fact
that regulators have little trust in their counterparts as one of the major limits on formal
regulatory cooperation).
110. COMM. ON MUT. RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS & RELIANCE IN THE REGULATION OF MEDS.,
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 14, at 6.
111. Correia de Brito et al., supra note 83, at 53 (citing the EU-Israel MRA as an example of
one the few pharmaceutical MRAs).
112. KENNETH HAAR, LORA VERHEECKE & MAX BANK, DANGEROUS REGULATORY DUET: HOW
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION UNDER TTIP WILL ALLOW BUREAUCRATS AND BIG
BUSINESS TO ATTACK THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5–6 (2016), https://corporateeurope.org/
sites/default/files/attachments/regulatoryduet_en021.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5NE-6Q69]; Jane
Kelsey,
Preliminary
Analysis
of
the
Draft
TPP
Chapter
on
Domestic Coherence 1 (Oct. 23, 2011) (unpublished memorandum), http://www.citizenstrade.org/
ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/TransPacific_RegCoherenceMemo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JL9FP3L8].
113. See Correia de Brito et al., supra note 83, at 49–52 (surveying multiple studies
that address the economic and trade impacts of MRAs but do not discuss the impact on
regulatory objectives).
114. Id. at 53.
115. See id. at 54 (citing the process of concluding the pharmaceutical component of the USEU MRA).
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emerge as regulators gain confidence in those arrangements and put
their newly redundant inspection resources to other uses.116
One example suggests that trade-driven equivalence
arrangements on pharmaceuticals can succeed, but they may require
time and supportive infrastructure to win over regulators and
consumers. The EC pioneered the use of equivalence determinations,
such as mutual recognition, when it became clear that, at the thencurrent pace, the process of harmonizing national laws and regulatory
standards to create a common market would take decades.117
Equivalence determinations preserve national institutions and
processes, provided an equivalent result may be reached. Some
commentators credit equivalence determinations, such
as
mutual recognition, as being “one of the engines [that] knit[ ]
together Europe.”118
The pharmaceutical sector was an early target for these efforts.
The significant differences and disparities in national drug approval
processes and timelines in the then-EU member states undermined the
EC effort to unite the original twelve nations into potentially the world’s
largest pharmaceutical market.119
The EC began working on a mutual recognition process for
pharmaceutical registration in 1975 when it established a multistate,

116. Examples of MRAs include the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement, which
produced an agreement to cooperate on developing food standards before national adoption. See
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act 1997, No. 190 (Austl.), https://www.legislation.gov.au/
Details/C2019C00116 [https://perma.cc/DT8B-PWMC]. Examples of regional trade agreements
include the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), a deal between Canada and
the EU with extensive provisions on product standards, mutual recognition, and regulatory
cooperation. See 2017 O.J. (L 11) 3–8 (Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member
States) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2017:011:FULL&from=en
[https://perma.cc/VK3E-UUWH].
117. Verdier, supra note 87, at 64.
118. David Zaring, Free Trade through Regulation?, 89 S. CALIF. L. REV. 863, 869 (2016); see
also Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT’L ORG. 363, 364
(2005) (contending that domestic constituents can exercise leverage to influence the government’s
international compliance decisions); Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal
Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 516, 519 (1997) (elaborating on the notion that
societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior in international politics by
shaping state preferences); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TwoLevel Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 434 (1988) (asserting that international negotiations are a twolevel game with domestic groups pursuing their interests at the national level and national
governments doing the same at the international level); Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and
Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 127, 128 (2010) (arguing that international legal commitments create coalitions between
those who will benefit from their state’s compliance and those who will benefit from other
states’ compliance).
119. David Vogel, The Globalization of Pharmaceutical Regulation, 11 GOVERNANCE 1, 1–2
(1998).
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or “decentralized,” procedure for drug approval. Under this process, a
manufacturer would first submit its product to any national
pharmaceutical regulatory agency, which would assess that application
and share its decision and report a summary of product characteristics,
and the approved labeling and package leaflet with other concerned EU
member states. Those other member states could accept that decision,
but final approval still resided with each member state and its national
regulatory body. For years, the decentralized procedure had little
impact on national drug approval policies, and, by 1987, only half of the
marketing approvals that were issued by one member state were
adopted by other member states.120 With more time and a supportive
EC infrastructure, including the Maastricht Treaty and the EMA, the
performance of the decentralized procedure has slowly improved. This
procedure is now the pathway through which most generic drugs are
approved in the EU.121
B. Regulatory Insufficiency as a Driver of
International Regulatory Cooperation
Regulatory authorities have also turned to equivalence
determinations and reliance arrangements to overcome their resource
limitations and to tackle cross-border externalities (e.g., climate
change) that cannot be addressed by a single regulator in isolation. In
these situations, necessity drives regulators to engage in equivalence
determinations and reliance arrangements with counterparts in order
to fulfill their institutional mandate. These regulator-driven
arrangements have tended to come together more quickly than those
arising from trade circumstances and have involved more substantive
regulatory reliance.
For example, in 2011, COFEPRIS, Mexico’s drug regulatory
agency, faced a backlog of eight thousand drug applications, mostly for
generic drugs. This backlog prompted broad reforms, including
establishing a mechanism for reciprocal drug approval.122 Under this
approval procedure, the manufacturer of a drug (i.e., the product
sponsor) may submit to COFEPRIS three documents from the
120. See id. at 3–5.
121. Sean Milmo, Europe Strives for a More Efficient Generic-Drug Approval Framework, 39
PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. 20, 20 (2015); Shweta Handoo, Vandana Arora, Deepak Khera, Prafulla
Kumar Nandi & Susanta Kumar Sahu, A Comprehensive Study on Regulatory Requirements for
Development and Filing of Generics Globally, 2 INT’L J. PHARMACEUTICAL INVESTIGATION 99, 99–
101 (2012).
122. Mexico Healthcare: Mexico’s Wave of Generics, ECONOMIST: INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Oct. 21,
2014),
http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/1652410149/mexicos-wave-of-generics/2014-10-21
[https://perma.cc/47DX-RH47].
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appropriate health authority in the country of product origin: a free sale
certificate, proof of drug approval, and written evidence that the drug
is being produced in compliance with good manufacturing standards.123
On that basis, COFEPRIS may grant a reciprocal approval for the use
of that drug in Mexico. Any new indications, dosages, or combinations
of that drug may be approved through the same abbreviated approval
procedure. Mexico also relaxed and simplified its import restrictions
and cut its generic drug approval timelines from 360 to 60 days. In 2015,
COFEPRIS estimated that, since adopting the policy, it has reduced by
90% its regulatory approval costs, increased its number of approved
generic drugs, lowered pharmacy costs, and increased the share of
generics in the country’s market.124 In 2012, the World Health
Organization (“WHO”) recognized COFEPRIS as a reference regulatory
agency for other Latin American countries.125
Another example of a regulator-driven arrangement is the EU
centralized procedure, which provides a single application, single
evaluation, and single marketing approval process for prescription
drugs, allowing direct access to all EU national markets. 126 The
principal motivation for establishing the centralized procedure was not
regulatory harmonization, but rather the pooling of regional regulatory
expertise on a difficult regulatory problem. In 1987, the national
regulatory authorities in EU member states lacked expertise in the
novel techniques needed to assess biotechnology medicines on the path
to market.127 The centralized procedure enabled these regulators to
work together on biotechnology product registration applications to
achieve a common decision.128 The centralized procedure did not require
123. Hector E. Chagoya, Juan Carolos Amaro & Nuria Becerril, Mexico – The Drug Approval
Process, in INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.04 (2012).
124. Thomas J. Bollyky & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Can Drug Importation Address High Generic
Drug Prices? 14 (Hutchins Ctr. on Fiscal & Health Policy at Brookings, Working Paper
No. 29, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/wp29_bollykykesselheim_
drugimportation.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3KJ-6PXJ].
125. PAN AM. HEALTH ORG., PAHO Recognizes COFEPRIS As a National Regulatory Authority
of Regional Reference, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 2, 2012), https://www.paho.org/en/news/2-72012-paho-recognizes-cofepris-national-regulatory-authority-regional-reference [https://perma.cc/
W5YL-56SZ].
126. Council Regulation (EEC) 2309/93 of July 22, 1993, Laying Down Community Procedures
for the Authorization and Supervision of Medicinal Products for Human and Veterinary Use and
Establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, 1993 O.J. (L 214) 1.
127. HEALTH, EDUC., & HUMAN SERVS. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EUROPEAN
UNION DRUG APPROVAL: OVERVIEW OF NEW EUROPEAN MEDICINES EVALUATION AGENCY AND
APPROVAL PROCESS 3–4 (1996), https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/222342.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QX98-QEMR].
128. A forerunner to the centralized procedure was the “concertation procedure,” launched by
the EC in 1987, which required member nations to consult an EU-level committee “prior to any
national decision relating to a high-technology medicinal product, with a view to arriving at
uniform decisions throughout the Community.” Council Directive (EEC) 87/22 of Dec. 22, 1986, on
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the dissolution of participating national regulatory authorities, which
was a sensitive issue of national sovereignty.129 Member states agreed,
however, to use common application documents.
The centralized procedure evolved relatively quickly. While the
decentralized procedure took decades to establish, the EC created the
centralized procedure in 1987 and formalized it six years later. It was
the first EU-wide drug regulatory procedure in which no member state
had issued an approval of a product before the procedure started.130 The
centralized procedure was initially mandatory for a small, defined list
of biotechnology and high-technology products and optional for all nonbiotechnological drugs considered potentially innovative. Over the
years, this mandatory list has been expanded to include medicines for
HIV/AIDS, cancer, diabetes, and neurodegenerative diseases; all
designated orphan medicines; and certain veterinary medicines.
Within its first year of formal operation, two-thirds of the
applications to the centralized procedure were submitted voluntarily
(i.e., they did not involve biologic drugs that were required to use the
pathway).131 The procedure effectively integrated the drug approval
process for newer therapies that might have otherwise proved
controversial across EU markets. 132 The U.S. Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) estimates that the centralized procedure
saved an estimated 40% of the cost and, more importantly, greatly
reduced approval times for obtaining separate marketing
authorizations in, at that time, fifteen EU member states.133
III. THE FDA AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
FOREIGN EQUIVALENCE DETERMINATIONS
The FDA has not fit neatly into either of the contexts—trade
initiatives or a collaboration among under-resourced regulators—in
the Approximation of National Measures Relating to the Placing on the Market of
High-Technology Medicinal Products, Particularly Those Derived from Biotechnology, 1986 O.J.
(L 15) 38.
129. Alar Irs, Truus Janse de Hoog & Lembit Rägo, Development of Marketing Authorization
Procedures for Pharmaceuticals, in EVALUATING PHARMACEUTICALS FOR HEALTH POLICY AND
REIMBURSEMENT 5 (Nick Freemantle & Susan Hill eds., 2004) (noting that in its initial form,
normal national regulatory reviews occurred after the committee review).
130. Id. at 6–7.
131. HEALTH, EDUC., & HUMAN SERVS. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 127,
at 12.
132. Id. at 2–5.
133. See id. at 10 (“Pharmaceutical industry officials acknowledge that filing NDAs under the
centralized procedure will allow a company to market its product(s) in all Member States within a
relatively short period of time at approximately 60 percent of the cost of obtaining 15 individual
marketing authorizations.”).
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which equivalence determinations have succeeded. The institutional
features of the FDA have made it difficult to establish workable
arrangements that recognize and rely on the equivalence of foreign
regulatory oversight. Despite congressional efforts to prod the FDA to
pursue such arrangements, the FDA has made far fewer
determinations of foreign regulatory equivalence than its counterpart
regulators in other nations or U.S. regulators like the USDA.
In this Part, we identify the reasons why the FDA has been more
reluctant than its counterparts to engage in foreign equivalence
determinations, including its consolidated authority over drug safety,
quality, and efficacy and its self-perception as the gold standard of
pharmaceutical regulation internationally. These institutional
preferences are reflected in the refusal of the FDA to subordinate its
core mandate to other U.S. foreign policy objectives and in the FDA’s
approach to international agreements generally. The recent
implementation of the United States’ only pharmaceutical MRA, after
a twenty-year delay, suggests a potential path forward to increasing the
FDA’s use of foreign equivalence determinations, including future U.S.
prescription drug importation efforts.
A. The FDA Has Consolidated Authority on Matters
Concerning Drug Safety, Quality, and Efficacy
The FDCA provides the FDA with the sole authority among U.S.
federal agencies for evaluating the safety, quality, and efficacy of
medicines.134 FDA officials have historically developed U.S. procedures
and standards in relative isolation from their foreign counterparts.135

134. Until relatively recently, the Department of Homeland Security, via the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection agency, was responsible for examining imported prescription drugs at the
nation’s international mail centers and borders and for detaining and destroying any FDAregulated prescription drugs that did not meet statutory or regulatory requirements. The FDA has
since assumed the primary responsibility for determining whether drug imports may legally enter
the country. The FDA has secured authority to adjudicate the legality over drugs imports and
exports and determinations of compliance under the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act
through interagency arrangements. Bijal Shah, Interagency Transfers of Adjudication Authority,
34 YALE J. REG. 279, 295 (2017). CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 10, at 3–4:
[T]he Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) administers the Controlled Substances Act,
which is a federal statute that establishes criminal and civil sanctions for the unlawful
possession, manufacturing, or distribution of certain addictive or dangerous substances,
including certain prescription drugs that share these properties, such as narcotics and
opiates. . . . Although many states also have their own laws that regulate drug
safety, the FDA maintains primary responsibility for the premarket approval of
prescription drug.
135. Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of
New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor
Agreements, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 55 (2002).
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The FDA participates in international pharmaceutical initiatives but is
not part of a regional, political, and economic union like the EU, nor is
it in a pairing of like-minded countries accustomed to cooperating on
regulatory and trade initiatives, such as Australia and New Zealand.136
Given its consolidated authority, the FDA’s limited use of
equivalence determinations is unsurprising. A regulator in a
consolidated system enjoys wide policymaking discretion and authority
at the domestic level and is less likely to engage in cross-border
coordination and cooperation.137 As Daniel Carpenter notes, autonomy
is a “proximate goal” for regulators because whether they are motivated
by the public benefit, personal gain, or legitimacy and reputation,
autonomy is “necessary to achieve it.”138 By contrast, a regulator with
constrained discretion will be more willing to bind itself to an
international accord.139
B. The FDA Considers Itself the Gold Standard
of Pharmaceutical Regulation
FDA officials generally consider their pharmaceutical regulatory
practices as setting the bar internationally because that has been the
reality for most of the organization’s history.140 Long before most of its
foreign peers, the FDA was an established agency with consolidated
authority over pharmaceutical regulation, a standardized NDA process,
an efficacy standard, and a premarket notification process. When the
thalidomide scandal broke in Europe in the late 1950s, there were
thousands of terrible episodes of birth defects, impairment, and deaths
in newborns. The FDA, which had not approved thalidomide, was
widely perceived domestically and internationally as having gotten it
right.141 Many of the regulatory agencies that exist today in Europe and
136. Id. at 77.
137. See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 13, at 228 (“Cross-border coordination will be less
attractive to a regulator in a consolidated system who enjoys wide policymaking discretion at the
domestic level.”).
138. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928, at 374–75 n.16 (2001);
see also DANIEL P. CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 75 (2010) [hereinafter CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND
POWER] (arguing in favor of reputation as a better explanation for what motivates regulators over
the public interest and regulatory capture theories); Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A
Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State,
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 929 (1996) (observing that self-interested regulators prize autonomy as
a means to “maximize the rough value of their bureaucracies”).
139. Hemel, supra note 13, at 228.
140. CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER, supra note 138, at 43.
141. The outcome was largely thanks to the vigilance of a single reviewer at the FDA, Frances
Kelsey, who resisted approving the drug despite pressure from the manufacturer and her superiors

2 - Bollyky & Kesselheim_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

U.S. PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION

10/13/2020 4:21 PM

1363

other high-income nations were created after the thalidomide crisis. In
the first decades that followed that crisis, many of these newer agencies
and the WHO drew from the FDA in formulating their pharmaceutical
regulatory standards, processes, and procedures.142
FDA officials have conceded that this mindset—the selfperception that the FDA is the “gold standard” for drug review143 and
able to fulfill its core institution mandates without the cooperation of
foreign counterparts—“may not ultimately impede FDA’s willingness to
enter into agreements of the mutual assistance variety, but . . . surely
will be an impediment to efforts to achieve agreement on substantive
standards.”144 Another acknowledged component of FDA culture is the
widespread sense among the staff of being overextended and underresourced. Yet, there has been little indication, until recently, that the
FDA views international collaboration as the means of reducing its
workload, instead seeing it as one more burden.145
It makes little difference for the present inquiry whether the
FDA still deserves to be considered the gold standard for
pharmaceutical regulation. At a time when only 17% of Americans
report trusting the U.S. federal government all or most of the time,
confidence in the FDA among the U.S. population remains relatively
high, although it too has declined in recent years.146 By virtue of the
stable legitimacy that the FDA enjoys among the public and medical
community, the agency has been able to resist the international
regulatory engagements that Congress and some organized industry
interests would have it pursue.

at the agency. Jeffrey Avorn, Learning about the Safety of Drugs — A Half-Century of Evolution,
365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2151, 2152–53 (2011).
142. CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER, supra note 138, at 43.
143. Kessler, supra note 18, at 214; Merrill, supra note 18, at 742–43.
144. Merrill, supra note 18, at 743.
145. Id. at 744. FDA statements have suggested that the institutional lack of interest in
international cooperation also extends to food. Criticized by the GAO for its lack of reliance on
foreign agency inspections, the FDA maintains that few countries seek comparability with the
United States because, in part, most countries will not meet the FDA requirement that a foreign
government’s domestic and export food safety systems be comparable to the U.S. system for food
products under the FDA’s jurisdiction. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-933, supra
note 14, at 1–2.
146. CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER, supra note 138, at 35 & n.16; Sarah D. Kowitt,
Allison M. Schmidt, Anika Hannan & Adam O. Goldstein, Awareness and Trust of the FDA and
CDC: Results from a National Sample of US Adults and Adolescents, 12 PLOS ONE, May 16, 2017,
at 15; PEW RESEARCH CTR., BEYOND DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW THEIR GOVERNMENT 60
(2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-viewtheir-government/ [https://perma.cc/B3UD-DS4P] (open “Complete Report PDF” at top right, and
view page 60); Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-2019/
[https://perma.cc/LEB5-BRXH].
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C. The FDA Has Resisted Subordinating Its Core
Institutional Mandate to Other U.S. Policy Objectives
The FDA and EC’s regulatory contexts differ in many respects,
including on trade. The EC Directorate General for Enterprise and
Industry has the dual mission of advancing free trade in the internal
market and with other nations, while ensuring public safety through
high pharmaceutical product and process standards. That twofold
mission has made it easier for the EMA and national pharmaceutical
regulators in the EU to pursue their public health and institutional
interests within trade negotiations. 147
In contrast to the European model, the FDA’s primary mission
is to protect U.S. public health, and it is not part of the U.S. government
agencies that promote international trade and commerce.148 The FDA
Modernization Act of 1997 established an Office of International
Relations and directs the FDA to “encourage” MRAs and to “support the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, in consultation with
the Secretary of Commerce, in efforts to move toward the acceptance of
mutual recognition agreements relating to the regulation of drugs,
biological products, [and] devices.”149 Despite that legislation, the FDA
has resisted subsequent initiatives that might subordinate its
gatekeeper mission on pharmaceuticals to other U.S. policy objectives,
such as facilitating trade, building foreign alliances, and lowering
pharmaceutical pricing.150
In 1998, the FDA released a compliance guide on international
memoranda of understanding (“MOU”), which summarizes the agency’s
institutional preferences on international matters. 151 The FDA treats
these MOUs as “similar to mutual recognition agreements . . . , referred

147. Shaffer, supra note 135, at 39–40.
148. 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2012).
149. Id. § 383(b), (c). Likewise, 19 U.S.C. § 2541 provides:
The Trade Representative has responsibility for coordinating United States discussions
and negotiations with foreign countries for the purpose of establishing mutual
agreements with respect to standards-related activities. In carrying out this
responsibility, the Trade Representative shall inform and consult with any Federal
agency having expertise in the matters under discussion and negotiation.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2541 (2012), amended by Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
150. The United States is also the only one of these nations that does not provide universal
health care or, in most parts of the U.S. health system, negotiate or restrain pharmaceutical prices.
CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER, supra note 138, at 714.
151. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY G UIDE SEC. 100.900 INTERNATIONAL
MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING (1995), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fdaguidance-documents/cpg-sec-100900-international-memoranda-understanding [https://perma.cc/
47GD-NXPQ].
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to in recent trade agreements,” and would include “equivalence
agreements . . . [and] mutual assessment of the comparability of a
foreign regulatory system.”152 In that guide, the FDA indicates that it
will enter into agreements designed to meet the following goals:
1. to enhance the FDA’s ability to ensure that regulated
products are safe, effective, of good quality, and properly
labeled;
2. to allow the FDA to use its resources more effectively or
efficiently, without compromising its ability to carry out its
responsibilities; and
3. to improve communications between the FDA and foreign
officials concerning FDA-regulated products.153
While the guidance notes that the FDA will endeavor to remain
aware of broader U.S. foreign policy objectives and international
policies, it also emphasizes that the international activities of the FDA
will place a higher priority on “improving the quality, safety, or efficacy
of products offered to consumers in the United States.” 154 The FDA will
“give a low priority to investing resources in developing a memorandum
of understanding with a foreign country that covers a product where
there is little likelihood of significant exports to the United States or
significant risk to the public.”155 The FDA has entered into productspecific MOUs, such as on the import of cantaloupe from Mexico,156 as
well as broader MOUs, such as on the accreditation of U.S. food
exporters to China.157
D. FDA Institutional Preferences Are Reflected in
Its International Arrangements
The FDA also has nearly 120 confidentiality agreements with
approximately thirty foreign governments and nongovernmental
organizations.158 These nonbinding executive agreements are distinct
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA - SENASICA MEXICO, MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE ENTRY OF MEXICAN CANTALOUPE INTO THE U.S. (2018),
https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/cooperative-arrangements/fda-senasica-mexico-mouconcerning-entry-mexican-cantaloupe-us [https://perma.cc/9BQF-D3A6].
157. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, AND CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION ADMINISTRATION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA REGARDING REGISTRATION OF U.S. FOOD MANUFACTURERS EXPORTING TO CHINA,
https://www.fda.gov/media/106010/download (last visited Aug. 31, 2020) [https://perma.cc/N3FFW6FN].
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from MOUs and, generally speaking, permit the FDA and its
counterparts to share and protect confidential information and to
explore future regulatory cooperation. In addition, the FDA also has
about seventy cooperative arrangements with a similar number of
governments; many are statements of intent or agreements to share
information and cooperate with foreign regulatory agencies or
intergovernmental organizations to ensure the safety and quality of
regulated drugs, foods, and medical devices generally and U.S. imports
in particular. Most are not binding, but there are a few exceptions.159
The FDA has also long worked with its foreign counterparts on
international standards for safe drugs, medical devices, and foods.
Since 1990, the FDA has participated in the International Council for
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for
Human Use (“ICH”) with EU, Swiss, Canadian, and Japanese drug
regulatory authorities and the international pharmaceutical
industry.160 The FDA has joined the Pharmaceutical Inspection Cooperation Scheme (“PIC/S”), an informal organization of the drug
manufacturing inspectorates from thirty-nine countries that share
pharmaceutical facility inspection information. The FDA also
participates in regulatory forums, such as the Canada-U.S. Regulatory

158. U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
CONFIDENTIALITY
C OMMITMENTS
(2020),
https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/international-arrangements/confidentialitycommitments [https://perma.cc/R23X-YHE9]; see also Sam Halabi, FDA’s International
Agreements: Typologies and Purposes, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Jan. 19, 2016),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/fda-s-international-agreements-typologies-and-purposes-by-sam-halabi/
[https://perma.cc/84LK-NPH6] (“FDA has over 120 international agreements in place with about
30 countries and multilateral partners.”).
159. In 2007, the FDA entered two memoranda of agreement (“MOA”) with the People’s
Republic of China aimed at improving the safety of Chinese food and drug products exported to
the United States. These MOAs allow U.S. officials to inspect food and drug production facilities
that export to the United States, require companies manufacturing drug components to register
with state drug regulators, and permit foreign third-party certification. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
FDA - AQSIQ CHINA, AGREEMENT ON THE SAFETY OF FOOD AND FEED (2007),
https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/cooperative-arrangements/fda-aqsiq-chinaagreement-safety-food-and-feed [https://perma.cc/G7RU-94C5]; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA SFDA CHINA, AGREEMENT ON THE SAFETY OF DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES (2007),
https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/cooperative-arrangements/fda-sfda-chinaagreement-safety-drugs-and-medical-devices [https://perma.cc/BZ3M-FDCM]. See generally
THOMAS J. BOLLYKY, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, GLOBAL HEALTH INTERVENTIONS FOR
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG SAFETY 9 (2009), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/091112_Bollyky_GlobalHealthInterventions_Web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E3Y6-D5T7 ] (discussing the two MOAs between the People’s Republic of China
and the FDA).
160. There are equivalent efforts on veterinary medicines and medical devices, and the FDA
participates, along with the USDA and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, with Codex
Alimentarius, co-convened by WHO and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, to generate
standards, guidelines, and codes of practice.
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Cooperation Council and APEC, which were established pursuant to
trade initiatives to increase regulatory transparency and coordination.
Despite participating in these international regulatory
networks, the FDA has entered into fewer equivalence determinations
than the counterpart regulatory agencies of other high-income
countries or related U.S. regulatory agencies. In 2012, the GAO
reported that the EU had determined the equivalence of one hundred
countries for fishery products and that the USDA Food Safety and
Inspection Service (“FSIS”) had determined the equivalence of thirtyfour countries to export meat, poultry, and processed egg products.
Fifteen nations have been determined as equivalent by both the EU and
FSIS.161 Most other ICH member nations have entered into multiple
MRAs with pharmaceutical provisions: the EU (seven);162 Australia
(five);163 Canada (four);164 and Switzerland (three).165
Only a small handful of FDA international agreements involve
equivalence determinations or reliance on a foreign regulatory
agency.166 The aforementioned 2012 GAO report indicates that,
161. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-933, supra note 14, at 35.
162. European Union-Switzerland; European Union-Israel; European Union-Japan; European
Union-New Zealand; European Union-Canada; European Union-Australia; European UnionUnited States. See Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA), EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY,
https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory/research-development/compliance/goodmanufacturing-practice/mutual-recognition-agreements-mra (last visited Aug. 31, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/LEN8-XL7C].
163. Australia-Canada; Australia-New Zealand Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition
Agreement (1997); Australia-European Union; Australia-European Free Trade Area (Republic of
Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, and the Kingdom of Norway); Australia-Singapore. See
International Agreements and Arrangements for GMP Clearance, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, GOV’T
OF AUSTL. (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.tga.gov.au/international-agreements-and-arrangementsgmp-clearance [https://perma.cc/CFJ3-N4NV].
164. Canada-Australia; Canada-European Union; Canada-European Free Trade Area
(Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, and the Kingdom of Norway); CanadaSwitzerland. See Health Can., Updates – Mutual Recognition Agreements, GOV’T OF CAN.
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/compliance-enforcement/
international/mutual-recognition-agreements/updates.html (last updated Apr. 4, 2012)
[https://perma.cc/T65B-EZQJ].
165. Switzerland-European Union; Switzerland-Canada; Switzerland-European Free Trade
Area (Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, and the Kingdom of Norway). See
International Agreements (Mutual Recognition Agreements - MRA), STATE SECRETARIAT FOR
ECON.
AFFAIRS
SECO, https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/en/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_
Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/Technische_Handelshemmnisse/
Mutual_Recognition_Agreement_MRA0.html (last updated Feb. 27, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
K2KP-6FQV].
166. See Richard Stewart, Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 724 (2005) (noting “[t]hese regulators’ work at home is authoritative, but
when they go abroad, their agreements lack the indicia of formality”). Generally speaking,
FDA clears its proposed agreements with foreign counterparts with the Department of
State, under procedures governing clearance of agency agreements known as the
Circular 175 process. The legal basis for this process is the State Department’s need to
comply with a statute, the Case-Zablocki Act, which requires the State to inform
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between 2006 and 2010, the FDA determined that five countries (Chile,
China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam) had an equivalent ability to
satisfy U.S. seafood safety standards and recognized no nations as
having food safety system equivalence.167 Following the GAO report, the
FDA has entered into three MOUs that recognize the equivalence
of food safety regulatory systems in New Zealand, Australia,
and Canada.168
The FDA has entered into just one MRA on pharmaceuticalrelated matters with the EU, and it took an act of Congress to conclude
the agreement and twenty years to implement. That example may be
instructive to future U.S. prescription drug importation efforts, so it is
summarized below.
E. The Long Road to the U.S.-EU MRA
Over the last fifteen years, the role of imported regulated
products in the FDA’s portfolio has changed. The volume of imported
products under the FDA’s purview increased from 0.5 million
shipments in 1970 to 3.7 million shipments in 1996 to 6 million in 2002

Congress of executive branch agreements with other countries that were not submitted
to the Senate as treaties for ratification under the U.S. Constitution.
Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonization, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 692,
712–13 (1998). Some have argued persuasively that there is little sign that the vast majority of
these agreements from the FDA and other U.S. executive branch agencies receive adequate
congressional scrutiny. See, e.g., Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments:
The Changing Landscape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1675, 1724 (2017)
(“[I]nternational law and administrative law provide accountability mechanisms for international
commitments that executive branch actors make without getting specific legislative approval. For
major international commitments, international negotiations and subsequent compliance
procedures often provide for considerable transparency and opportunities for broader
participation.”); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1261 (2008) (“[T]here are several areas of
law in which all significant international agreements were concluded through the Article II
process, and any congressional-executive agreements appear to be entered pursuant to obligations
under a treaty obligation or under the sole authority of the President . . . .”).
167. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-933, supra note 14, 28–29.
168. Food Safety Systems Recognition Arrangement Between the Australian Department of
Agriculture and Water Resources and the FDA of the United States of America, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/cooperative-arrangements/
food-safety-systems-recognition-arrangement-between-australian-department-agriculture-andwater [https://perma.cc/NFA5-JTCK]; FDA - CFIA and Health Canada, Food Safety Systems
Recognition Arrangement, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (last updated Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/cooperative-arrangements/fda-cfia-and-healthcanada-food-safety-systems-recognition-arrangement [https://perma.cc/L2S7-BSUJ]; Food Safety
Systems Recognition Arrangement Between the Ministry for Primary Industries of New Zealand
and the Food and Drug Administration of the United States, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 10,
2012), https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/cooperative-arrangements/fda-new-zealandmpi-food-safety-systems-recognition-arrangement [https://perma.cc/GH4T-NBNK].
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to 24 million in 2012.169 Between 2005 and 2012, imports of
pharmaceutical products increased by nearly 13% annually.170
In 2007 and 2008, there was a series of scandals involving the
safety of imported, FDA-regulated goods from China. Batches of
counterfeit heparin, a blood thinner used for patients undergoing
kidney dialysis or heart surgery, caused nineteen deaths and hundreds
of allergic reactions in the United States and nearly 250 deaths
worldwide. Under congressional questioning, FDA officials admitted
they mistakenly failed to conduct an inspection of the Changzhou
Scientific Protein Laboratories plant, which was ultimately identified
as the source of the adulteration.171 Director of the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research Janet Woodcock testified that the FDA would
need another $225 million annually to inspect all foreign drug plants at
the frequency many said was needed: every other year. 172 She noted,
however, that the agency was budgeted to only spend $11 million on
foreign drug inspections in fiscal year 2008.173
President George W. Bush established an Interagency Working
Group on Import Safety in 2007, and in 2008, the FDA opened eight
foreign offices in China, Europe, India, South Africa, Latin America,
and the Middle East. By 2016, however, only twenty-nine FDA staff
members were assigned to work in these foreign offices, and many
positions were going unfilled.174 The FDA has closed its posts in
Johannesburg, South Africa; Amman, Jordan; Parma, Italy; Mumbai,
India; and Guangzhou and Shanghai, China.175
While the FDA budget for foreign inspections is growing, it
cannot keep pace with the proliferation of foreign manufacturing sites.
“According to FDA officials, the agency obligated approximately $53
million to foreign inspections in fiscal year 2010. This amount has
increased each year since, rising to $92 million in fiscal year 2015.”176
The average cost of a foreign drug inspection has lessened over the
years, but remains high. The average cost for an FDA foreign inspection

169. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 21, at 5; Sharon Smith Holston, An Overview of
International Cooperation, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 197, 198 (1997).
170. U.S FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 21, at 15.
171. Berndt et al., supra note 21, at 113; BOLLYKY, supra note 159, at 8.
172. Gardiner Harris, Heparin Contamination May Have Been Deliberate, F.D.A. Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/health/policy/30heparin.html
[https://perma.cc/2PJN-88BW].
173. Id.
174. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY O FFICE, GAO-17-143, FDA HAS IMPROVED ITS FOREIGN
DRUG INSPECTION PROGRAM, BUT NEEDS TO ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STAFFING OF I TS
FOREIGN OFFICES 12–13 (2016).
175. Id. at 11 n.25.
176. Id. at 16–17.
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exceeded $60,000 in fiscal year 2009 and declined to $57,600 for fiscal
year 2015.177 The FDA performed drug inspections in sixty-eight
countries between the fiscal years 2010 and 2016, but three-quarters of
these inspections were conducted in ten countries. 178 FDA inspected
establishments in India most often, with establishments in China and
Germany also being among the most frequently inspected.179
In fiscal year 2015, the FDA, for the first time, conducted more
foreign than domestic inspections.180 The FDA has also improved the
accuracy and completeness of information on its catalog of drug
establishments subject to inspection.181 Further, the GAO reported
that, as of 2016, the FDA has never inspected one thousand of the
approximately three thousand foreign establishments under its
oversight; while high, the current rate of foreign establishments with
no FDA inspection—33%—is down from 64% in 2010.182
Faced with a growing demand for foreign inspections that the
FDA could not meet alone, the agency reengaged with the EU on a longdormant 1998 MRA to implement its provisions on determining the
equivalence of post-approval pharmaceutical GMP inspections.183
Between September 2014 and November 2017, the FDA observed the
EU’s internal audits of its inspectorates to ensure that each was
functioning properly and did not deviate in any relevant way from EU
law and the PIC/S compliance assessment program.184 After observing
an audit of the drug inspectorate in each of the twenty-eight EU
countries, the EMA and the FDA agreed to enter into an MRA in 2017,
which amended the sectoral annex to the 1998 U.S.-EU MRA.185
Before implementing the amended MRA, however, the FDA
insisted on additional measures to limit the potential risk of the
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 20–21.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS / THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION
AGREEMENT 1 (July 2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/103391/download [https://perma.cc/XX46377J]. In 2013, the FDA also established a trade office to take a more “comprehensive and
proactive” role in the regulatory cooperation discussions occurring as part of trade negotiations.
FDA Takes More Active Role In TTIP, TPP Talks; Establishes Trade Team, 31 INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
no. 35, Sept. 6, 2013. More recently, the FDA has pushed for regulatory cooperation initiatives
with the EU, started as part of the TIIP talks, to occur in parallel, but separate from those
negotiations. Id.
184. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 183, at 2.
185. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Mutual Recognition Promises New Framework
for Pharmaceutical Inspections for United States and European Union (Mar. 2. 2017), https://
www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/mutual-recognition-promises-new-frameworkpharmaceutical-inspections-united-states-and-european [https://perma.cc/D96X-ALN2].
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arrangement. The amended MRA allows “FDA and EU inspectorates to
use inspection reports and other related information obtained during
drug manufacturing facility inspections, whether conducted by an EU
or FDA inspectorate, to help determine whether a facility is
manufacturing high quality drugs.”186 Both the FDA and the EU
reserved the right to inspect at any time and in any country. Although
the original MRA covers preapproval inspections, the current
implementation plan does not include them. Current GMP inspections
of facilities manufacturing vaccines and plasma-derived products have
also yet to be included in the implementation plan, although they may
be added after 2022.187 The FDA insisted on conducting capability
assessments of each EU country’s inspectorates before recognizing their
drug manufacturing facility inspections. The amended 2017 agreement
was conditional on those assessments being completed by July 15,
2019.188 When the agreement was signed in 2017, then-FDA
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb commented:
At a time in which medical product manufacturing is truly a global enterprise, there is
much to be gained by partnering with regulatory counterparts to reduce duplicative
efforts and maximize global resources while realizing the greatest bang for our collective
inspectional buck . . . . By partnering with these countries we can create greater
efficiencies and better fulfill our public health goals, relying on the expertise of our
colleagues . . . .189

Between November 2017 and July 2019, the FDA conducted
assessments of all twenty-eight member states.190 Those assessments
included national reviews of specific member states, which assessed a
country’s conflict-of-interest policies, its laws on good manufacturing
practices, samples of inspection reports, inspector training records,
inventory of drug manufacturing facilities, surveillance program, and
relevant standard operating procedures. On July 11, 2019, four days
before the deadline, the FDA concluded its final assessment of an EU
member state (Slovakia).191

186. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 183, at 1.
187. Id. at 2.
188. Id. at 2–3.
189. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Unprecedented Step Toward More
Efficient Global Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Inspections (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm583057.htm [https://perma.cc/76UF-GSRJ].
190. See Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/international-arrangements/mutual-recognitionagreement-mra (last updated May 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Z6TL-22PC].
191. Id.
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F. The Future of Equivalence Determinations at the FDA
The FDCA provides the FDA its authority and mandate on
pharmaceutical regulation, but, as Carpenter observes, the FDA’s
power to achieve that mandate depends on its reputation for preventing
harm with professional and scientific networks, product sponsors,
consumers, and media organizations.192 Accordingly, the FDA will act
to defend its reputational interests, and, since it has consolidated
authority over pharmaceutical regulation, it will generally act alone.193
Other national regulatory authorities with a different mandate (e.g.,
the EC with its mixed mandate for trade and regulation) or less
consolidated authority (e.g., a historically under-resourced authority
such as COFEPRIS) may be more amenable to accepting equivalence
determination and to achieving a broader range of goals. With its
institutional character, history, and reputational interests, the FDA is
a different animal.
The eventual accession to the U.S.-EU MRA coincided with the
slow recognition that the FDA is unable to fulfill its public health
mandate to inspect foreign pharmaceutical manufacturing on its own.
The challenge facing the FDA goes well beyond post-approval GMP
inspections. Most prescription drugs are commodities produced and sold
by multinational manufacturers in global supply chains that operate all
over the world, including in countries with weaker regulations than
those of the United States. Today, drug manufacturers rely on
expansive networks of subcontractors to do the clinical testing and
production of medicines, sometimes working with as many as two
hundred contracted manufacturing organizations for the production of
APIs and the bulk assembly, production, and packaging of finished
products.194 Drugs and vaccines are reaching unprecedented numbers
of people worldwide, including in low- and middle-income countries, but
there are significant differences in national regulations that prevent
the sharing of post-market safety surveillance data on the detection,
assessment, understanding, and prevention of drug- and vaccinerelated adverse effects.195 Even a well-resourced regulatory agency such
as the FDA will, if acting alone, struggle to maintain sufficient expertise
192. CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER, supra note 138, at 10–11, 43–44.
193. Past efforts to alter the FDA’s authority (MMA on importation) and its relationships with
other U.S. agencies (FDAMA on trade) have conditioned those changes on the continued fulfillment
of the FDA’s mandate on public health, reinforcing the FDA’s authority to oppose those changes.
194. COMM. ON MUT. RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS & RELIANCE IN THE REGULATION OF MEDS.,
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 14, at 70.
195. Id. at 89–90; BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., REPORT OF THE SAFETY AND SURVEILLANCE
WORKING
GROUP
14–15
(2013),
https://docs.gatesfoundation.org/documents/
SSWG%20Final%20Report%201 1%2019%2013_designed.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEY3-EQMX].
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to stay abreast of the rapidly evolving science of medicines for gene
therapy and other advanced therapeutics in order to ensure the quality,
safety, and efficacy of these cutting-edge medicines.196 In the next Part,
we explore the circumstances in which the FDA is most likely to rely on
the equivalence of the processes and oversight of its foreign regulatory
counterparts to fulfill its institutional mandate.
IV. GENERIC DRUG SHORTAGES ARE A PUBLIC HEALTH
PROBLEM THAT IMPORTATION CAN RESOLVE
Drawing on the expressed institutional and reputational
preferences of the FDA as well as reviews of common factors for
successful international regulatory cooperation, eight factors should
drive such cooperation involving the FDA, including the equivalence
determinations that would enable prescription drug importation.197
Those factors are:
1. the problem to be addressed is a public health matter within
the FDA’s mandate;
2. it is a problem over which the FDA does not
have consolidated authority (i.e., cannot foreseeably solve
it alone);
3. there is evidence to suggest the proposed equivalence
determination and reliance arrangement might address the
public health problem without unduly undermining the core
mandate of the FDA to oversee quality and safety and to
prevent consumer harm;
4. there is support among FDA constituents (appropriators,
consumers, industry officials, and others) for the proposed
equivalence determination and reliance arrangement;
5. there is a feasible path to implementing the equivalence
determination within existing FDA authorities;
6. the counterpart governments are like-minded and at a
similar level of economic development, and the FDA has or

196. COMM. ON MUT. RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS & RELIANCE IN THE REGULATION OF MEDS.,
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 14, at 7.
197. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV., INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION:
ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES 94–97 (2013) (factors included the selection of: (a) issue-areas
where government regulators can benefit from the cooperation by, for example, advancing their
mandates on health and safety aspects; (b) areas with regulatory problems similar to those
counterpart governments; (c) partners that share similar objectives of regulation and/or standards
and where social, economic, political, and technological conditions are similar; (d) activities in
which participating regulatory authorities have confidence in the technical and regulatory skills
of counterparts, and/or where regulators trust each other; and (e) regulatory subject matter on
which international standards exist).

2 - Bollyky & Kesselheim_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

1374

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

10/13/2020 4:21 PM

[Vol. 73:5:1331

realistically can gain confidence in their technical and
regulatory skills;198
7. the other participating regulatory authorities share an
interest in the equivalence determination; and
8. it is a regulatory subject matter on which international
standards exist.
The Trump Administration’s program on prescription drug
importation fails to meet most of these criteria. The FDA has made its
general preferences consistently clear on prescription drug importation:
it does not wish to enter into binding equivalence arrangements that
permit new, unapproved medications into the United States without
direct FDA oversight. The goal of lowering domestic drug prices is not
sufficient to overcome that reluctance. Presidential interest and highlevel congressional engagement might produce a new system of
prescription drug importation, but thirty years of FDA practice and
opposition on international matters suggest that such a new drug
importation system will not be quickly implemented.
The fundamental flaw of the Trump Administration’s program
is that it largely recycles past proposals in the apparent hope that
presidential interest will yield a different result. It is also difficult to
imagine that the FDA will be more willing to implement the statutory
requirements of section 804 of the MMA, including the certification
requirement that there will be no additional risk to public health, now
that importation would occur in time-limited state demonstration
projects instead of directly under FDA-HHS control.199 A further
complicating matter is how such a scheme would work without the
support of the Canadian government, which has said it opposes the
Trump program.200
By contrast, however, the persistent problem of U.S. generic
drug shortages may be an issue for which U.S. prescription drug
importation might work. For years, concerns over the inaccessibility

198. Sykes, supra note 99, at 68:
Plainly, mutual recognition is more likely to be attractive where the preexisting
differences in policy across jurisdictions are modest, and do not implicate highly
sensitive issues. Thus, it is more likely to be attractive between two countries at a
comparable level of development and per capita income than, for example, between a
developed nation and an undeveloped nation. It is also more likely to be attractive
where serious issues of human health and safety are not in play.
199. Separately, it is hard to imagine states being willing to spend the time and resources to
set up an importation apparatus if that project is only a time-limited “demonstration” project
without more definitive prospects for permanence. Of course, the proposal is only a notice of a
potential future proposed rule, so even if it was designed to be realistically achieved, its prospects
for being implemented are years away.
200. Martell, supra note 67.
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and high prices of U.S. prescription drugs focused on patent-protected,
brand-name medicines. Low-cost generic drugs—FDA-approved,
interchangeable, off-patent versions of the same products made by
different manufacturers—were considered part of the solution to that
problem. More recently, however, price hikes and shortages of offpatent drugs or products using decades-old active ingredients have been
in the news headlines and have drawn the attention of policymakers.
From the rising costs of the epinephrine autoinjector (EpiPen) to the
unscrupulous pricing practices of Valeant and Martin Shkreli’s Turing
Pharmaceuticals, widely publicized controversies involving decades-old
drugs have generated congressional investigations and sparked public
concern.201 But the problem is worse than most Americans recognize;
there have also been dozens of similar, less well-known episodes
involving shortages of essential chemotherapy medicines and fastescalating prices for lifesaving drugs to treat heart failure.202
Given these stories, both in the news and not, it is unsurprising
that generic prescription drug prices are rising. One out of eight U.S.
generic drugs in 2014 exhibited annual price growth in excess of 20%,
and the average increase in generic prices that year was 38%.203 One
review found that among over twenty-one thousand generic products
from the years 2008 to 2015, four hundred (2%) increased more than
1,000%.204 Given that so many Americans rely on inexpensive generic
prescription drugs (over four billion generic prescriptions were filled in
2016), these prices affect a large share of the U.S. population.205
A. The Role of Generic Drugs in the U.S. Health System
The U.S. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act, informally known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, catalyzed the modern
201. Melody Petersen, How 4 Drug Companies Rapidly Raised Prices on Life-Saving Drugs,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016, 3:35 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-senate-drug-pricestudy-20161221-story.html [https://perma.cc/YA9J-YZEF].
202. Gretchen Morgenson, Defiant, Generic Drug Maker Continues to Raise Prices, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
14,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/business/lannett-drug-price-hikebedrosian.html [https://perma.cc/9XMY-8GZJ].
203. Rena M. Conti, Kevin H. Nguyen & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Generic Prescription Drug
Price Increases: Which Products Will Be Affected by Proposed Anti-gouging Legislation?, J.
PHARMACEUTICAL POL’Y & PRAC., Nov. 21, 2018, at 6. At the time of writing, multiple federal and
state investigations into price fixing by generic pharmaceutical manufacturers are ongoing. Riley
Ray Griffin, David McLaughlin & Ben Elgin, A Massive U.S. Drug Price-Fixing Probe Has Hit
Major Roadblocks, BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019generic-drug-price-fixing/ [https://perma.cc/25P5-VXY5].
204. Kesselheim et al., supra note 24, at 860.
205. Steven M. Lieberman & Paul B. Ginsburg, Would Price Transparency for Generic Drugs
Lower Costs for Payers and Patients?, BROOKINGS INST. 1, 3 (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/es_20170613_genericdrugpricing.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE66-37MT].
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U.S. generic drug industry by formalizing an abbreviated pathway for
generic manufacturers to obtain FDA approval. No longer did
manufacturers need to conduct expensive clinical trials to prove generic
versions of non-patent-protected drugs were safe and efficacious.
Instead, the Hatch-Waxman Act set a pathway by which a
manufacturer could file an ANDA to show its drug is interchangeable
with a brand-name counterpart in several ways. To be approved under
the Hatch-Waxman abbreviated pathway, the generic drug must have
the same active ingredient, route of administration, dosage form (e.g.,
pill or suppository), strength, and intended use as the approved brandname alternative.206 Generic manufacturers must also meet FDA
quality manufacturing standards and conduct small-scale studies to
show that their products are bioequivalent to their brand-name
counterparts.207 Bioequivalence may be demonstrated through in vitro
studies as well as pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic testing,
usually involving two dozen patients. 208
Generic medicines play a critical role in the U.S. system because
of their widespread use and relatively low cost. Despite the recent
increases in their price, generics cost 75% less, on average, than the
retail price of U.S. brand-name drugs.209 In 2016, generic medications
constituted 89% of the dispensed medications in the United States but
only 27% of overall drug spending.210 The heavy use of generics in the
U.S. health system saved an estimated $1.67 trillion in health care costs
from 2007 to 2017.211 Use of generic drugs has increased U.S. patients’
access to life-saving medications, has improved medication adherence,
and is associated with improved patient health outcomes.212 The
206. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii).
207. Requirements for Submission of Bioavailability and Bioequivalence Data, 21 C.F.R.
§ 320.21 (2020).
208. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR I NDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND
BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES FOR ORALLY-ADMINISTERED DRUG PRODUCTS – GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS 10 (2003), https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/Guidance-for-IndustryBioavailability-and-Bioequivalence-Studies-for-Orally-Administered-Drug-Products---GeneralConsiderations.PDF [https://perma.cc/BCS8-N4KT].
209. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRICING: RESEARCH ON
SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 1 (2012).
210. Generic Pharm. Ass’n, Generic Drugs Continue to Deliver Billions in Savings to the U.S.
Healthcare System, New Report Finds, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 19, 2016, 12:40 ET),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/generic-drugs-continue-to-deliver-billions-in-savingsto-the-us-healthcare-system-new-report-finds-300347698.html [https://perma.cc/9AA5-AP5N].
211. ASS’N FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDS., GENERIC DRUG ACCESS & SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 5, 20 (2017),
https://accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/2017-AAM-Access-Savings-Report-2017web2.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4PS-KHUS] (reporting data and analysis from IQVIA, then known as
Quintiles IMS).
212. Joshua J. Gagne, Niteesh K. Choudhry, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jennifer M. Polinski, David
Hutchins, Olga S. Matlin, Troyen A. Brennan, Jerry Avorn & William H. Shrank, Comparative
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Affordable Care Act depends on increased usage of generic medications
to offset the costs of expanded coverage.213 President Trump has
suggested that any health care reform pursued by his Administration
will include lowering the “artificially high price” of U.S. prescription
drugs, which is likely to involve relying on competition from generic
drugs as well.214
The relatively low cost and widespread use of generics in the
United States stem from the way that drugs are dispensed. Starting in
the late 1970s, U.S. states began repealing the anti-substitution
dispensing laws that had prevented pharmacists from substituting
other versions of a drug for the specific brand-name version indicated
on a prescription.215 Surveys have consistently shown that many
physicians do not know the generic name or price of the drugs they
prescribe and will often continue to rely on medications’ brand names
when writing their prescriptions, even after generics enter the market.
Accordingly, a new series of state laws is replacing anti-substitutions
laws to permit, or even require, pharmacists to substitute FDA-certified
generics for branded drugs if available; in some states, the switch is
required even without seeking patient consent.216 In the late 1980s,
pharmaceutical benefit managers, health maintenance organizations,
and Medicaid programs followed suit, instituting strong financial
incentives for patients to accept generic substitution. These insurance
plans also reimbursed pharmacy drug purchases at a set maximum
allowable cost, which created incentives for pharmacies to seek the
cheapest version of a drug to earn the largest profit.217 That business
model has helped spur the consolidation of the pharmacy industry into
large chains, such as Walmart, that could obtain the lowest drug prices
by negotiating large purchases. It has also helped dramatically expand
Effectiveness of Generic and Brand-Name Statins on Patient Outcomes, 161 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 400, 406 (2014); William H. Shrank, Tuyen Hoang, Susan L. Ettner, Peter A. Glassman,
Kavita Nair, Dee DeLapp, June Dirstine, Jerry Avorn & Steven M. Asch, The Implications of
Choice: Prescribing Generic or Preferred Pharmaceuticals Improves Medication Adherence for
Chronic Conditions, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 332, 335–36 (2006).
213. See Ian D. Spatz, Health Reform Accelerates Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1331, 1331–32 (2010) (“Generics now make up 75 percent of all prescriptions but
only 21 percent of prescription drug spending.” (footnotes omitted)).
214. Donald J. Trump, President, U.S., Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to
Congress (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/28/remarkspresident-trump-joint-address-congress [https://perma.cc/9Z9V-S9S4].
215. Patricia M. Danzon & Eric L. Keuffel, Regulation of the Pharmaceutical-Biotechnology
Industry, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND I TS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 433, 447 (Nancy
L. Rose ed., 2014).
216. Christopher Stomberg, Drug Shortages, Pricing, and Regulatory Activity 7 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22912, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22912
[https://perma.cc/Z3CS-9N6E].
217. Danzon & Keuffel, supra note 215, at 433.
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the role of generics in the U.S. drug market,218 which accounted for only
about 19% of prescription purchases in the United States in 1984.219
The low-cost, high-volume generic drug market has shaped the
generic manufacturing industry in ways that go beyond its increased
U.S. market share. Automatic substitution at the pharmacy has meant
that most generic drug manufacturers do not advertise or invest in
consumer brand recognition. Competition is based on price, and
manufacturers make their drugs as cheaply as possible within the
bounds of quality standards. Generic drug prices fall when multiple
firms enter the market, each trying to gain market share through price
discounts. A recent study found that generic drug prices are driven
down to 77% of the brand-name price when two competitors are in the
market, 46% when there are five generic competitors, and 25% when
there are nine.220 The drugs that are likely to have the most generic
entrants are large-market, higher-priced, and easier-to-manufacture
drugs, typically tablets for the chronic diseases that represent most of
the U.S. health burden.221 The greatest profit for a generic
manufacturer is typically earned early in the period right after the
expiration of the patent and other exclusivity on a drug, particularly if
the firm earns a six-month duopoly by virtue of being the first to
successfully challenge a brand-name manufacturer’s patent.222 Among
mature generic products with multiple competitors, it tends to be a race
to the bottom on price.223 As other firms enter the market, the incentive
to remain a supplier diminishes as the price of the drug approaches its
marginal cost.224 A manufacturer will continue to sell an older generic
drug if the marginal cost of keeping that product line is low, there are
strong economies of scale in that drug’s production, or there are
synergies with the manufacturer’s other product lines.

218. Ann M. Thayer, 30 Years of Generics: The Door that Legislation Unlocked for Generic
Drugs Three Decades Ago Has Blown Wide Open, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Sept. 29,
2014), https://cen.acs.org/articles/92/i39/30-Years-Generics.html [https://perma.cc/5XYN-KYGB]
(citing IMS Health Data).
219. Bollyky & Kesselheim, supra note 124, at 3.
220. Chintan M. Dave, Abraham Hartzema & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Prices of Generic Drugs
Associated with Numbers of Manufacturers, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2597, 2597–98 (2017).
221. Danzon & Keuffel, supra note 215, at 432–33.
222. David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 37, 38 (2006).
223. Stomberg, supra note 216, at 9.
224. Clay P. Wiske, Oluwatobi A. Ogbechie & Kevin A. Schulman, Options to Promote
Competitive Generics Markets in the United States. 314 JAMA 2129, 2129–30 (2015).
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B. The Factors Driving U.S. Generic Drug Shortages and Price Hikes
When firms stop manufacturing an older, generic medication,
the market for that product may undergo major changes. Both the
supply and demand of a generic medicine can be inelastic, which means
that the need for that drug and its production may not respond to
changes in its price. The demand for a generic medicine is inelastic
when that drug is a medical necessity to patients and there is no good
therapeutic substitute.225 The supply of a generic drug is inelastic,
particularly in the short-run, because existing suppliers must invest in
and get FDA approval for any new manufacturing facilities or
production lines that would be required to meet the shortfall in the
supply of the drug.226 New suppliers of the drug have those same
manufacturing barriers in addition to the need to run bioequivalence
studies to gain FDA approval.227 Generic drug firms take a calculated
risk in financing bioequivalence studies and in entering the
marketplace without knowing the number of competitors that will enter
the market or how quickly the price of the product will decline. New
entrants typically must offer lower prices than existing producers to
gain market share.
Recent examples of market failures in the U.S. generic drug
industry abound and have only increased with the tragic onset of the
novel coronavirus pandemic.228 The last decade has seen an
increasing number of drug shortages, which the FDA defines as a
“period of time when the demand . . . for the drug within the United
States exceeds the supply of the drug . . . .”229 The FDA tracks drug
shortages involving medically necessary products that have an
important effect on public health. A medically necessary drug is
used to treat or prevent a serious disease or medical condition for
which no acceptable drug alternative is available in adequate
supply. Drug shortages are worrisome because they can result in
delaying or denying needed care to patients and may force
physicians to prescribe an alternative medicine that is riskier or
less effective.

225. Stomberg, supra note 216, at 13.
226. Id.
227. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-706, PART D GENERIC DRUG PRICES
DECLINED OVERALL, BUT SOME HAD EXTRAORDINARY PRICE INCREASES 8 (2016).
228. Knvul Sheikh, Essential Drug Supplies for Virus Patients Are Running Low, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/health/coronavirus-drug-shortages.html
[https://perma.cc/2TA7-MZ8F].
229. 21 U.S.C. § 356c(h)(2) (“Discontinuance or interruption in the production of lifesaving drugs.”).
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The problem of drug shortages reached a critical point in 2011.
That year, U.S. drug shortages rose to an unprecedented level with 251
medically necessary drugs approved but unavailable. The GAO found
that the number of active drug shortages tripled from 154 in 2007 to
456 in 2012. 230 Most of the U.S. drug shortages involved older, offpatent products.231 Many of the high-profile cases concerned parenteral
(generally sterile injectable) drugs, including epinephrine (used in cases
of cardiac arrest and anaphylactic shock), propofol (used with
anesthesia for surgery),232 and chemotherapy agents.233 These
shortages have struck former blockbuster drugs such as buspirone
(Buspar), doxazosin (Cardura), atorvastatin (Lipitor), gabapentin
(Neurontin); antivirals such as acyclovir (Zovirax); and antibiotics like
tetracycline (Sumycin) and ciprofloxacin (Cipro).234 The prevalence of
drug shortages for FDA-approved drugs, vaccines, and biologics has
been as high as 12% in recent years, and most have involved markets
that had been served by three or fewer producers.
President Obama issued an executive order in November 2011,
which Congress later codified in the FDASIA, requiring manufacturers
to notify the FDA of impending production disruptions in certain
prescription medications.235 These early notifications provide the FDA
and drug manufacturers more time to prevent disruptions in supply
from turning into long-term shortages and thereby harming patients.236
With the FDASIA came the passage of the Generic Drug User
Fee Amendments (“GDUFA”) of 2012, which became effective on
230. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-194, DRUG SHORTAGES: PUBLIC HEALTH
THREAT CONTINUES, DESPITE EFFORTS TO HELP ENSURE PRODUCT AVAILABILITY 40 (2014).
231. Paul Le, Enrique Seoane-Vazquez, Rosa Rodriguez-Monguio, Erin R. Fox, Sheryl L.
Szeinbach, Allen R. Dunehew & Michael Montagne, The Prevalence of Pharmaceutical Shortages
in the United States, 8 J. GENERIC MEDS. 210, 214 (2011).
232. Janet Woodcock & Mia Wosinska, Economic and Technological Drivers of Generic Sterile
Injectable Shortages, 98 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 170, 170 (2013).
233. Benjamin J. Davies, Thomas J. Hwang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Ensuring Access to
Injectable Generic Drugs — The Case of Intravesical BCG for Bladder Cancer, 376 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1401, 1402 (2017).
234. Stomberg, supra note 216, at 6.
235. Exec. Order 13588, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,295 (Oct. 31, 2011); see also Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act, 21 U.S.C. § 356c (2012) (indicating that the FDA must
employ “all appropriate administrative tools, including its authority to interpret and administer
the reporting requirements in 21 U.S.C. 356c, to require drug manufacturers to provide adequate
advance notice of manufacturing discontinuances that could lead to shortages of drugs that are
life supporting or life sustaining, or that prevent debilitating disease”).
236. “Drug shortages are particularly challenging for acute care because of the low tolerance
for delays that can occur during the search for therapeutic alternatives. . . . The act of substitution
also carries a higher risk of medication errors in [emergencies] than in nonacute settings.” Serene
I. Chen, Erin R. Fox, M. Kennedy Hall, Joseph S. Ross, Emily M. Bucholz, Harlan M. Krumholz &
Arjun K. Venkatesh, Despite Federal Legislation, Shortages of Drugs Used in Acute Care Settings
Remain Persistent and Prolonged, 35 HEALTH AFF. 798, 798–99 (2016).
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October 1, 2014. This legislation, based on the user fee model for NDAs,
provides guarantees of timely review of ANDAs in exchange for user
fees paid by the ANDA applicants, which help the FDA fulfill those
commitments. Under the GDUFA, the FDA committed to take
regulatory action on 90% of new ANDAs within ten months of
submission and to hire and train more than one thousand new generic
drug reviewers by 2017.237 The FDA also issued new policy guidance to
expedite applications for generic drugs that are critical to public health
or have the potential to mitigate drug shortages.238 This guidance has
recently been updated to provide the highest prioritization to ANDAs
for which there are fewer than three generics approved and for which
the drugs are in shortage.239 In July 2016, the FDA announced that it
had already met its GDUFA goals. 240 The GDUFA has been
reauthorized, and the number of ANDA approvals increased
dramatically from 390 approvals in 2014 to 729 in 2018—an increase
of 87%.241
Nevertheless, U.S. generic drug shortages are rising again. The
number of annual new U.S. drug shortages in 2018 reached levels
237. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Generic
Drug
User
Fee
Amendments,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/GenericDrugUserFees/default.htm (last updated Aug.
4, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ECY9-ZZS5].
238. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, MANUAL OF POLICY AND
PROCEDURES (MAPP) 5240.3 REV. 1, PRIORITIZATION OF THE REVIEW OF ORIGINAL ANDAS,
AMENDMENTS, AND SUPPLEMENTS 2–4 (2014), https://www.fdanews.com/ext/resources/files/08/0807-14-ANDAPrioritization.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD7U-NS26] [hereinafter MAPP 5240.3 Rev. 1].
239. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, MANUAL OF POLICY AND
PROCEDURES (MAPP) 5240.3 REV. 5, PRIORITIZATION OF THE REVIEW OF ORIGINAL ANDAS,
AMENDMENTS, AND SUPPLEMENTS 2–3 (2020), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/
centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cder/manualofpoliciesprocedures/ucm407849.pd
f [https://perma.cc/QV6G-KGWK] [hereinafter MAPP 5240.3 Rev. 5]; see also MAPP 5240.3 Rev. 1,
supra note 238.
240. Prioritizing Public Health: The FDA’s Role in the Generic Market Place: Hearing before
Subcomm. on Agric., Rural Dev., Food & Drug Admin., and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on
Appropriations, 114th Cong. 4 (2016) (statement of Janet Woodcock, Director, Center for
Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration) [hereinafter Prioritizing Public
Health]; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, ANNUAL REPORT 2016: ENSURING
SAFE, EFFECTIVE AND AFFORDABLE MEDICINES FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC (2016),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/app
rovalapplications/abbreviatednewdrugapplicationandagenerics/ucm542710.htm
[https://perma.cc/WJ2U-SY73].
241. THE IQVIA INST., MEDICINE USE AND SPENDING IN THE U.S.: A REVIEW OF 2018 AND
OUTLOOK
TO
2023,
at
25
(2019),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
54d50ceee4b05797b34869cf/t/5cd765e5c49ce70001f3449a/1557620199759/medicine-use-andspending-in-the-us---a-review-of-2018-outlook-to-2023.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW4L-U6Z4]. Since
the enactment of the GDUFA, FDA reliance on user fees has increased from $121 million in fiscal
year 2013 to $373 million in fiscal year 2016, or 45% of total program obligations in fiscal year
2013 to 76% in fiscal year 2016. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-452, APPLICATION
REVIEW TIMES DECLINED, BUT FDA SHOULD DEVELOP A PLAN FOR ADMINISTERING ITS
UNOBLIGATED USER FEES (2017).
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unseen since President Obama’s executive order. As of August 2019,
there are 282 active shortages, the highest level since March 2014, and
the number of active shortages has steadily increased over the last
consecutive seven quarters. Just over half (55%) are injectables, and
prominent shortages exist among generic injectables and other drugs
for cancer and cardiovascular conditions.242
Increased demand is one factor. Americans, as a population, are
aging and consuming more generic drugs, with Medicaid and Medicare
rolls swelling with retiring baby boomers. The Affordable Care Act has
meant more people have access to health insurance, increasing the
demand for generic medications.243 The growth in generic drug
manufacturing capacity has not kept up.244 Several other supply side
factors have contributed as well.
1. Older Medicines
The prices of older medications—many of them generic—have
risen dramatically, but those increases were masked by the overall
trends in the U.S. market. According to a 2016 GAO study, U.S. generic
drug prices fell 59% from the first quarter 2010 to second quarter 2015,
but those declines occurred mostly in higher-priced drugs that were
newly eligible for generic competition.245 By contrast, the price of more
than three hundred of the 1,441 generic drugs sold in the United States
throughout that same five-year period experienced price increases of
100% or more. Almost all of those three hundred drugs were older,
“established” generic medicines on the market throughout the five-year
period GAO studied. In the vast majority of cases, the GAO found that
the elevated price for the older, established generic medicines persisted
for multiple years.
Speculators observing this trend began purchasing the rights to
manufacture older, single-source, off-patent drugs and drastically
hiking their prices. The highest-profile case involved Turing
Pharmaceuticals, which purchased the rights to pyrimethamine
(Daraprim), a sixty-two-year-old treatment for toxoplasmosis, and
raised its price overnight by more than 5,000%, from $13 to $750 per

242. AM. SOC’Y OF HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACISTS, DRUG SHORTAGES STATISTICS (2020),
https://www.ashp.org/Drug-Shortages/Shortage-Resources/Drug-Shortages-Statistics
[https://perma.cc/8368-9PVX].
243. Berndt et al., supra note 26, at 2.
244. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-194, supra note 230.
245. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-706, supra note 227.

2 - Bollyky & Kesselheim_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

U.S. PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION

10/13/2020 4:21 PM

1383

tablet.246 Valeant Pharmaceuticals bought the rights to manufacture
and sell off-patent but single-source isoprenaline (Isuprel) and sodium
nitroprusside (Nitropress), raising their prices 500%.247 Rodelis
Therapeutics acquired the rights to cycloserine (Seromycin), a drug
treating multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, and raised its price from
$500 to $10,800. The list continues, including price hikes for colchicine
(Colcrys) for gout, which experienced a 50-fold increase,248 and digoxin
(Lanoxin) to treat heart failures and other cardiovascular conditions.249
2. Lack of Competition
The recent trends in generic drug shortages and price hikes
share a proximate cause: inadequate competition from qualified sources
of a drug. About 10% of branded drugs with expired patents presently
have no generic competition.250 One recent study of 1,120 generic drugs
shows that drugs with a duopoly, near-monopoly, or monopoly were
associated with price increases of 29%, 59%, and 116%, respectively,
over the study period (2008–2013), compared with the reference
baseline level of drugs with the highest level of competition.251
The reasons for that lack of competition, however, are multiple.
Fierce competition in the U.S. generic market has led to consolidation
and driven out competitors.252 Incentives are often insufficient to entice
new manufacturers to enter generic markets for smaller markets or
246. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugsprice-raises-protests.html [https://perma.cc/9DS6-6YUD].
247. Id.
248. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Daniel H. Solomon, Incentives for Drug Development—The
Curious Case of Colchicine, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2045, 2046 (2010).
249. Victoria Colliver, Prices Soar for Some Generic Drugs, SFGATE (Jan. 1, 2014, 12:13 PM),
https://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Prices-soar-for-some-generic-drugs-5105538.php
[https://perma.cc/Y9ZR-7JVJ].
250. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING
AND EVALUATION, UNDERSTANDING RECENT TRENDS IN GENERIC DRUG PRICES 11 (2016),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/175071/GenericsDrugpaperr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3LALJKAG] (noting that among “1,328 approved branded drugs, there is a sizable group, about 10
percent, whose exclusivities and patents have expired, but no drug companies have come forward
to submit ANDAs”).
251. Letter from Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, to William S.
Comanor and Diana L. Moss, Am. Antitrust Inst. (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.antitrustinstitute.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/AAI_Teva-Allergan-Ltr-to-FTC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TFE74493]. See also Jonathan D. Alpern, William M. Stauffer & Aaron S. Kesselheim, High-Cost
Generic Drugs — Implications for Patients and Policymakers, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1859, 1860
(2014) (discussing how reductions in the number of generic manufacturers supplying a market can
lead to price increases among the suppliers that remain).
252. S. Kumar, Teva Buys Allergan: 3 Reasons Why It’s a Blockbuster Deal, FORTUNE (July 27,
2015, 4:22 PM), https://fortune.com/2015/07/27/teva-buys-allergan-mergers-and-acquisitionsconsolidation-botox-copaxone-healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/EM5D-5ENE].
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older drugs. A 2016 report by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation at the HHS assessed 1,328 approved brandname drugs and found that 10% were no longer subject to patents or
other forms of market exclusivity but still had not attracted drug
companies to submit ANDAs.253 There is a higher incidence of
insufficient generic competition for Orphan Drug Act—designated
drugs with small patient populations.254
With the passage of the GDUFA, the FDA has significantly
reduced its backlog of ANDAs, but poor-quality ANDAs and insufficient
understanding of FDA requirements still slow the process. The GAO
found that only 12% of the 2,030 generic drug applications reviewed by
the FDA from fiscal years 2015 through 2017 were approved in the first
review cycle. According to the FDA, generic drug applications go
through an average of three cycles of review before being approved.255
A November 2016 congressional oversight hearing noted that, as a
result of resubmissions, the median time required for the FDA to
approve an ANDA was forty-seven months.256 The GDUFA fees are an
additional barrier to entry for smaller generic firms and may be
decreasing the numbers of the generic drug manufacturers, with more
exiting and fewer entering the market over time. A recent study found
that while the average number of manufacturers per generic product is
five, the median has dropped to two, and the share supplied by one or
two is increasing.257
3. Complex Generic Drugs
Another factor that has made the generic drug market less
predictable is the growth in the number of complex generic drugs.258
Because complex generic drugs can be more difficult to produce and
more intricate in formulation and delivery than simple, small-molecule
tablets (although not quite as complex as protein-based medicines),259
253. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 250, at 11.
254. Ravi Gupta, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Nicholas Downing, Jeremy Greene & Joseph S. Ross,
Generic Drug Approvals Since 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1391,
1393 (2016).
255. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-565, FDA SHOULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS
TO ADDRESS FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT APPROVAL RATES IN THE FIRST REVIEW CYCLE (2019).
256. Prioritizing Public Health, supra note 240, at 8.
257. Berndt et al., supra note 21, at 135.
258. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL
IMPERATIVE 98–99 (Norman R. Augustine, Guru Madhavan & Sharyl J. Nass eds., 2018); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-706, supra note 227; Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note
232, at 170–76; Stomberg, supra note 216, at 28–30.
259. Zachary Brennan, House Panel Calls on GAO to Study FDA’s Approval Pathway for
Complex Generics, REG. AFF. PROF. SOC’Y (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus
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national regulatory authorities may be reluctant to rely on other
national regulatory agencies’ assessment of bioequivalence alone when
considering whether to approve them. Complex generics can include
narrow therapeutic index drugs, controlled-release and modifiedrelease formulations, skin patches, inhalers, and multi-ingredient
products.260 Other nonbiological complex drugs may include structures
that cannot be isolated and fully characterized by chemical
analytical means and depend on consistent, tightly controlled
manufacturing to produce. Examples include iron-carbohydrate
complexes, liposomes, and nano-medicines.261
In some cases, brand-name companies have put barriers in place
to approving complex generics by filing citizen petitions that argue that
the generics are not comparable or by refusing to supply products for
bioequivalence testing.262 As a result, the FDA has been slower to
approve ANDAs for complex generics, resulting in higher barriers to
entry for potential competitors for these drugs.263
4. Lapses of Manufacturing Quality and Capacity
Rising challenges in maintaining sufficient quality in the supply
of older generics have also been a factor in shortages of generic drugs.
This is particularly true for sterile injectable drugs. In 2009 and 2010,
the FDA pushed manufacturers to retool their manufacturing and
supply chains with greater emphasis on quality in sterile injectable
medicines. This push is reflected in the increase in the number of both
%E2%84%A2/news-articles/2015/12/house-panel-calls-on-gao-to-study-fda%E2%80%99sapproval-pathway-for-complex-generics [https://perma.cc/KF9P-7B5X]; Alicia Mundy, New
Generic Lovenox Recieves FDA Approval, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424053111903374004576580713942376344 [https://perma.cc/F8SQ-H2KP].
260. Barbara Davit, April C. Braddy, Dale P. Conner & Lawrence X. Yu, International
Guidelines for Bioequivalence of Systemically Available Orally Administered Generic Drug
Products: A Survey of Similarities and Differences, 15 AAPS J. 974, 978, 983 (2013); Suzanne
Dunne, Bill Shannon, Colum Dunne & Walter Cullen, A Review of the Differences and Similarities
Between Generic Drugs and Their Originator Counterparts, Including Economic Benefits
Associated with Usage of Generic Medicines, Using Ireland as a Case Study, BMC PHARMACOLOGY
& TOXICOLOGY, Jan. 5, 2013, at 11.
261. Daan J.A. Crommelin, Vinod P. Shah, Imre Klebovich, Scott E. McNeil, Vera
Weinstein, Beat Flühmann, Stefan Mühlebachg & Jon S.B. de Vlieger, The Similarity
Question for Biologicals and Non-Biological Complex Drugs, 75 EUR. J. OF PHARMACEUTICAL
SCI. 10, 13–14 (2015).
262. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Joshua J. Gagne, Product-Specific Regulatory Pathways to
Approve Generic Drugs: The Need for Follow-Up Studies to Ensure Safety and Effectiveness, 38
DRUG SAFETY 849, 851 (2015).
263. EpiPen Price Increases: How Regulatory Barriers Inhibit Pharmaceutical Competition:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children and Families of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor
and Pensions, 114th Cong. 1 (2016) (statement of Scott Gottlieb, Resident Fellow, American
Enterprise Institute).
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inspections and noncompliance letters issued over those two years.264
The change was necessary to address quality concerns, and there are
signs that the industry has adapted to the increase in regulatory
oversight. There has also been, however, a reduction in the number of
suppliers of sterile injectable drugs since 2012.265 Higher
manufacturing standards and an increased emphasis on quality may be
reasons why the estimated cost of a successful ANDA has increased
from between $1 to 2 million in 2005 to as high as $15 million in 2015.266
Other factors have also increased the consequences of
manufacturing lapses. U.S. law does not require manufacturers to
maintain excess capacity.267 Margins in the generic industry are thin,
so there is little redundant qualified manufacturing capacity, and
disruptions like natural disasters have resulted in shortages of drugs
and medical supplies. In 2014, Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico
incapacitated one of just three suppliers of medical saline to the United
States, and the remaining two suppliers could not increase their
production to cover the shortfall. 268 In 2017, a merger between Hospira
and Pfizer appears to have led to reductions in product lines and
shortages of several injectable drugs, including sodium bicarbonate,
which is commonly used in hospitals during surgeries, emergency
events, and some chemotherapy. A public outcry and congressional
inquiry followed.269 In July 2018, then-FDA Commissioner Gottlieb
established the Agency Drug Shortages Task Force to assess the

264. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-595, DRUG SHORTAGES: CERTAIN FACTORS
ARE STRONGLY ASSOCIATED WITH THIS PERSISTENT PUBLIC HEALTH CHALLENGE 26 (2016).
265. Id. at 36–37.
266. Henry Grabowski, Iain Cockburn & Genia Long, The Market for Follow-On Biologics:
How Will It Evolve?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1291, 1291–93 (2006); Scott Gottlieb, How Obama’s FDA
Keeps Generic Drugs Off the Market, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2016, 6:25 PM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-obamas-fda-keeps-generic-drugs-off-the-market-1471645550
[https://perma.cc/L89W-9S7R].
267. Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 232, at 175; see also Chana A. Sacks, Aaron S.
Kesselheim & Michael Fralick, The Shortage of Normal Saline in the Wake of Hurricane Maria,
178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 885, 885–86 (2018) (discussing FDA efforts to increase the supply of
essential medications).
268. Maryann Mazer‑Amirshahi & Erin Fox, Saline Shortages — Many Causes, No Simple
Solution, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1472, 1473 (2018); Laurie McGinley, Hospitals Scramble to Avert
Saline Shortage in Wake of Puerto Rico Disaster, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2017, 5:26 PM
CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/10/09/hospitals-scrambleto-avert-saline-shortage-in-wake-of-puerto-rico-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/3ATZ-E3Y4].
269. Letter from Richard Blumenthal, U.S. Senator, to Maureen Ohlhausen, Acting
Chairperson, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Letter%20to%20FTC%20on%20Pfizer%20Drug%20Shortage.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5UXYM4VG].
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sources of drug shortages and propose potential long-term solutions
to Congress.270
C. Why Prescription Drug Importation May Work to
Address U.S. Generic Drug Shortages
We propose that the FDA should establish a pathway for
granting reciprocal drug approval to approved generic versions of U.S.
medications that do not have patent protection or other forms of
exclusivity but nevertheless lack sufficient generic competition.
Because current models suggest that at least four generic competitors
are required before substantial price reductions occur,271 the reciprocal
approval pathway should be open to generic-eligible medicines with
fewer than four approved versions that were manufactured and sold in
the United States during the six months prior to reciprocal approval.
The benefit of this pathway is that it allows the market to
increase the supply and decrease the cost of generics in a safe and
relatively fast way by introducing the possibility of international
competition for U.S. generic drugs that are at risk for shortages or
dramatic price hikes.272 Existing manufacturers of an already-approved
drug can more easily expand their production to serve the U.S. market
than a new entrant can obtain an ANDA and build new manufacturing
capabilities. Limiting the use of the reciprocal drug approval pathway
to generic versions of drugs that are already approved and used in the
United States minimizes the potential safety risks that might arise
from relying on the approval of other national regulatory authorities for
novel drugs (which we do not support). Further, limiting the pathway
to drugs for which there is insufficient generic competition builds
on existing FDA authority to permit importation to address
drug shortages.
Given the expressed institutional and reputational preferences
of the FDA and past examples of successful equivalence determinations,
this proposal is a model of prescription drug importation that could be
successfully implemented. This model draws on previous precedents
and the existing platforms for regulatory cooperation in the
pharmaceutical sector.
270. Agency
Drug
Shortages
Task
Force,
U.S.
FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-shortages/agency-drug-shortages-task-force (last updated Oct. 30,
2019) [https://perma.cc/FT3L-BSB4].
271. See Dave et al., supra note 220, at 2597–98.
272. Alfred B. Engelberg, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Addressing Generic Drug
Unaffordability and Shortages by Globalizing the Market for Old Drugs, HEALTH AFF. (Feb. 23,
2016),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/02/23/addressing-generic-drug-unaffordability-andshortages-by-globalizing-the-market-for-old-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/FK4T-YF64].
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1. Generic Drug Shortages Are a Public Health
Matter Squarely Within the FDA’s Mandate
Generic prescription drug shortages are a persistent public
health crisis, inflicting serious harm on patients and undermining the
effective provision of medical care. The FDA has long recognized this
crisis and acted accordingly. Starting in 2010, the FDA began
expediting its review of submissions related to new manufacturing
sites, suppliers, and specification changes to reduce potential and
ongoing shortages.273 On October 31, 2011, President Obama issued
Executive Order 13588, entitled “Reducing Prescription Drug
Shortages,” directing the FDA to “use all appropriate administrative
tools” to redress existing and potential shortages.274 Congress, with the
passage of FDASIA, provided the FDA with new powers,
responsibilities, and requirements to address the drug shortages.275 The
FDA may seek other manufacturers that are willing and able to
increase production. The FDA may also expedite inspections and
reviews and exercise temporary enforcement discretion to permit the
use of foreign, unapproved sources of FDA-approved medically
necessary drugs.276
2. Generic Drug Shortages Are a Problem that the
FDA Cannot Solve on Its Own
Since 2012, the FDA has implemented a variety of measures to
remedy generic drug shortages. After the enactment of GDUFA, the
FDA expedited the ANDA review process and significantly reduced its
backlog of applications. In 2017, the FDA published its list of more than
250 off-patent, off-exclusivity drugs without approved generics “[t]o
improve transparency and encourage the development and submission
of abbreviated new drug applications” in markets with no
competition.277 That list was published as part of a broader FDA Drug
Competition Action Plan, one goal of which is to maintain three or more

273. Sharona Hoffman, The Drugs Stop Here: A Public Health Framework to Address the Drug
Shortage Crisis, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 13 (2012).
274. Exec. Order No. 13,588, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,295, 68,295 (Nov. 3, 2011).
275. 21 U.S.C. §§ 356c-356e, 381(d) (2012).
276. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE CTR. DIR., MANUAL OF POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES (MAPP) 4190.1 Rev. 3, DRUG SHORTAGE MANAGEMENT (2018), https://www.fda.gov/
media/72447/download [https://perma.cc/H25F-HRMC].
277. List of Off-Patent, Off-Exclusivity Drugs Without an Approved Generic, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. 10 (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/133524/download [https://perma.cc/2MYTWYC8].

2 - Bollyky & Kesselheim_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

U.S. PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION

10/13/2020 4:21 PM

1389

manufacturers for each generic product.278 The FDA now grants priority
review status to applications for drugs that address specific
circumstances, including a lack of generics of brand-name drugs, drug
shortages, and public health emergencies.279 Despite all these efforts,
generic drug shortages are increasing in number and duration.
In recent years, the FDA launched initiatives to engage foreign
manufacturers to help increase generic drug competition and reduce
shortages. In the last several years, for example, the FDA used
“regulatory flexibility and discretion” to allow for the temporary
importation of drugs not approved for use in the United States and
manufactured in Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, and Canada.280 In 2018, the
FDA observed that regulatory barriers prevent generic drug developers
from entering multiple markets, which limits competition, increases
prices, and raises the risk of shortages. Accordingly, the FDA launched
an initiative to harmonize generic drug approval application standards
and procedures internationally.281 In July 2018, HHS Secretary Azar
also announced a new working group to examine how to safely import
prescription drugs from other countries in the event of a dramatic price
increase for a drug produced by one manufacturer and not protected by
patents or exclusivities.282 In the years that have followed, there have
278. MAPP 5240.3 Rev. 5, supra note 239; Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA
Tackles Drug Competition to Improve Patient Access (June 27, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/fda-tackles-drug-competition-improve-patient-access
[https://perma.cc/2YNS-GMNG].
279. The FDA may grant priority review status to generic drug applications under several
circumstances, including for: (1) first generic drugs; (2) drugs that experienced a shortage; and (3)
other designations, such as for drugs that could help address public health emergencies.
Applicants with priority generic drug applications may communicate with the FDA two months
before the application is submitted to facilitate the FDA’s review. An eight-month priority review
may be granted for priority generic drug applications with pre-submission correspondence that
includes complete and accurate facilities information at least two months before submission of the
application. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(11) (2012); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GDUFA
REAUTHORIZATION PERFORMANCE GOALS AND PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022,
at 4 (2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/101052/download [https://perma.cc/TXH9-CV9F].
280. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN FOCUS: PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION 2 (2018),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11056 [https://perma.cc/GYM9-95E3]; see also
Brennan, supra note 57 (providing an example of the FDA allowing temporary importation of drugs
to meet demand); AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 57 (same); FDA Approves Temporary Importation
of
Amino
Acids,
ASPEN,
http://www.nutritioncare.org/News/General_News/
FDA_Approves_Temporary_Importation_of_Amino_Acids/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/5399-TAGU] (same).
281. Scott Gottlieb, Advancing Toward the Goal of Global Approval for Generic Drugs: FDA
Proposes Critical First Steps to Harmonize the Global Scientific and Technical Standards for
Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voicesperspectives-fda-leadership-and-experts/advancing-toward-goal-global-approval-generic-drugsfda-proposes-critical-first-steps-harmonize (last updated Oct. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3T4MMZPH].
282. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Secretary Azar Directs FDA
to Establish Working Group on Drug Importation to Address Price Spikes (July 19, 2018),
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been no public statement regarding the membership of the working
group or the timeline for its work.
3. Generic Drug Importation Addresses Shortages Without
Undermining the FDA’s Mandate
Past drug importation proposals purportedly sought to import
drugs, but they were, in fact, designed to take advantage of other
nations’ governmental pricing systems that the U.S. Congress could—
but will not—establish directly for U.S. payers. 283 It is, therefore,
unsurprising that U.S. health officials have been disinclined to
overcome the complexities of ensuring the safety of already-marketed
drugs imported from foreign pharmacists and wholesalers. By contrast,
drug importation shows promise as a means of sustainably reducing
U.S. generic drug costs and improving patients’ access to safe and
essential medicines.
A 2018 study (of which we were coauthors) assessed whether
U.S. generic prescription drugs at risk of sudden price increases or
shortages in the United States are available from independent
manufacturers approved in other well-regulated settings around the
world. We found that nearly two-thirds of these drugs had at least one
manufacturer approved by a non-U.S. regulator and that one out of five
had four or more approved.284 In 2015, Medicaid alone spent nearly
$700 million on generic drugs that lacked adequate U.S. competition
and that could have had a manufacturer approved by non-U.S. peer
regulatory agencies.285 In 2018, the FDA examined the set of
approximately four hundred generic prescription drugs with the lowest
volumes sold in the United States and found that more than a third
were available from single manufacturers in another stringently
regulated market.286
Generic prices have historically been higher in the EU and
Canada than in the United States, but this ceases to be the case when
there is only one FDA-approved supplier. 287 A 2019 study empirically
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/07/19/hhs-secretary-azar-directs-fda-establish-workinggroup-drug-importation-address-price-spikes.html [https://perma.cc/PJ8J-BCSL].
283. Marv Shepherd, Drug Importation and Safety of Drugs Obtained from Canada, 41
ANNALS OF PHARMACOTHERAPY 1288, 1288–89 (2007).
284. Ravi Gupta, Thomas J. Bollyky, Matthew Cohen, Joseph S. Ross & Aaron S. Kesselheim,
Affordability and Availability of Off-Patent Drugs in the United States—The Case for Importing
from Abroad: Observational Study, BRIT. MED. J., Mar. 19, 2018, at 5.
285. Id.
286. Gottlieb, supra note 281.
287. Danzon & Keuffel, supra note 215, at 433 (noting that price competition among generic
versions has historically resulted in the U.S. generics generally being cheaper than in Europe and
other nations, although some European nations have recently adopted reforms to lower generic
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shows that the average price of such U.S. drugs is 200 to 400% higher
than the average price for that medicine in four countries where the
government intervenes in generic drug prices.288
Expanding prescription drug importation to novel drugs that the
FDA has never assessed is risky for patients and likely to be politically
unsustainable. It is not uncommon that adverse events, sometimes
serious ones, arise in relation to newly approved drugs.289 It is,
therefore, difficult to imagine in cases involving novel drugs that
patients and congressional overseers would accept the justification that
regulators in Europe and Canada had assessed the use of the product.
The public health risk of prescription drug importation is much
reduced by limiting its use to foreign versions of drugs already approved
by the FDA and in use by U.S. patients. Fundamentally, the strategy
proposed here involves much less complicated bioequivalence
determinations and nonessential benefit/risk determinations than
those involved in assessing a novel drug.290 By limiting the importation
pathway to foreign versions of already-approved FDA prescription
drugs, this pathway would build on the confidence that the FDA has in
its decision to approve a particular ANDA, the confidence that the
prices); Olivier J. Wouters, Panos G. Kanavos & Martin McKee, Comparing Generic Drug Markets
in Europe and the United States: Prices, Volumes, and Spending, 95 MILBANK Q. 554, 564–65
(2017) (same); see also RYAN CONRAD & RANDALL LUTTER, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERIC
COMPETITION AND DRUG PRICES: NEW EVIDENCE LINKING GREATER GENERIC COMPETITION AND
LOWER GENERIC DRUG PRICES 2–3 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/133509/download
[https://perma.cc/2QPW-KCQR] (reporting that the most significant price declines in generics only
occur with the entry of three or more competitors).
288. The comparator countries were Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom. Sharat Ganapati & Rebecca McKibbin, Non-Tariff Barriers and Bargaining in Generic
Pharmaceuticals 2, 41 (Georgetown Univ., Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 18-18-23, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313630 [https://perma.cc/YX3H-6HGV].
289. Karen E. Lasser, Paul D. Allen, Steffie J. Woolhandler, David U. Himmelstein, Sidney M.
Wolfe & David H. Bor, Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals for Prescription
Medications, 287 JAMA 2215, 2219 (2002).
290. Concerns have been raised recently about the safety of generic drugs generally. See, e.g.,
KATHERINE EBAN, BOTTLE OF LIES: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GENERIC DRUG BOOM (2019); Anna
Edney, America’s Love Affair with Cheap Drugs Has a Hidden Cost, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2019,
3:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-01-29/america-s-love-affair-withcheap-drugs-has-a-hidden-cost [https://perma.cc/P77M-FDR4]. The FDA has argued that those
concerns are not supported in current data. But see Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., and Director of FDA’s Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research Janet Woodcock, M.D., on the FDA’s Continuing Efforts to Maintain Its
Strong Oversight of Generic Drug Quality Issues Domestically and Abroad (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scottgottlieb-md-and-director-fdas-center-drug-evaluation-and-research-0
[https://perma.cc/JA549VKW] (noting that drugs manufactured outside the United States are required to meet the same
standards as drugs made domestically and that FDA sample testing did not indicate any episodes
of poor quality). Canada and other stringently regulated markets apply largely the same methods
to ensure drug safety, and we are aware of no data to suggest that the same response would not
hold for such markets.
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constituents of the FDA have in that decision, and the existing safety
record of that marketed product.
The pathway for prescription drug importation must be designed
to preserve the FDA’s role in its oversight. For example, the FDA should
reserve the right to require labeling to match that of the brand-name
version in the United States, which may word warnings differently than
the same brand-name drug in the reciprocal country.291 The FDA should
also still reserve its authority to refuse to import an otherwise eligible
generic medicine to remedy potential drug shortages, but should issue
a detailed opinion on any such refusal, explaining its rationale so as to
maintain the predictability of the system. In the near term, the
prescription drug importation pathway should exclude complex
generics so that the mechanism may build trust before it is expanded to
more difficult contexts. The pathway should include a maintenance
organization to monitor performance, ensure common use of
terminology, and assess the possibility of extending the pathway to
complex generics and other drug categories.
4. Broad, Bipartisan Support for Generic
Prescription Drug Importation
The strategies proposed are competition based and designed to
attract bipartisan support. Variations of this strategy have been
proposed by leading figures across the political spectrum. President
Trump campaigned on reducing U.S. drug prices, at one point saying
that “[a]llowing consumers access to imported, safe, and dependable
drugs from overseas will bring more options to consumers.”292 Joshua
Sharfstein, a deputy FDA commissioner during the Obama
Administration, and coauthors have also called for the FDA to allow
temporary importation of generic drugs approved in other stringently
regulated markets in the event that prices for the U.S. versions of those
generic drugs spike.293 In 2016, a bipartisan report from the Senate
Special Committee on Aging also proposed that Congress “give the
F.D.A. authority to allow imports of medicines in narrowly defined
291. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jessica M. Franklin, Jerry Avorn & Jon D. Duke, Speaking the
Same Language? International Variations in the Safety Information Accompanying Top-Selling
Prescription Drugs, 22 BRIT. MED. J. QUALITY & SAFETY 727, 731 (2013) (discussing the substantial
variations in the listing of safety information in popular drugs in the U.S., Canada, U.K.,
and Australia).
292. David Nather, Trump’s Health Care Plan Takes (Another) Page from the Democrats,
STAT
(Mar.
2,
2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/02/trump-health-care-plan/
[https://perma.cc/8YCK-3Q3W].
293. See Jeremy A. Greene, Gerald Anderson & Joshua M. Sharfstein, Role of FDA in
Affordability of Off-Patent Pharmaceuticals, 315 JAMA 461, 461 (2016).
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circumstances, when consumers face sharp, sudden increases in the
price of off-patent drugs that have no competition.”294
Other stakeholders are supportive as well. A blue ribbon
committee, the Committee on U.S. Drug Pricing at the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, found that “[i]n the
absence of evidence of harm (as opposed to the concerns surrounding
potential harm) with respect to importation of generics and biosimilars
when competition is lacking, and given the potential cost savings for
patients, policy experiments related to generic and biosimilar
importation could be useful.”295 The U.S. generic drug industry has
expressed support for a single development pathway that would have a
similar effect as this proposal here.296
5. Implementing U.S. Generic Prescription
Drug Importation Is Feasible
Our generic prescription drug importation proposal is designed
not to require major legislative changes to the FDA’s current
authorities and not to undercut the agency’s essential role in evaluating
and overseeing the quality, safety, and efficacy of the medicines used in
the United States.
There are three possible routes to implement our suggested
strategy without significant legislative changes. First, the FDA could
approve an ANDA for the imported product using evidence of the
marketing approval and inspection of the stringent regulatory
authority that the FDA deems equivalent. While the Hatch-Waxman
Act requires the submission of evidence sufficient to show that a generic
drug is bioequivalent to an existing drug, it does not specify the precise
nature of the evidence required. The FDA may approve an ANDA on a
much abbreviated basis to address potential shortages or for public
health reasons.297 The agency may also be able to issue approvals based
on data already collected and assessed by the regulatory authority in
294. Robert Pear, Senate Aims to Stop Firms from ‘Buying Up Drugs and Jacking Up Prices,’
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/us/politics/prescription-drugprices.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/EQ2W-GJX3] (“The imports would be allowed only from
countries with drug safety standards similar to those in the United States and would end ‘as soon
as the monopoly was broken up.’ ” (quoting S. REP. NO. 114-429 (2016)).
295. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 258, at 123.
296. See A Single Development Pathway Can Improve Patient Access to Generic Drugs, ASS’N
FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDS., https://accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/1-aam-fact-sheetGDUFA_0.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2020) [https://perma.cc/H45S-DHJE].
297. MAPP 5240.3 Rev. 5, supra note 239, at 2; 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(4) (2020). A priority
review may be granted following a request from the applicant (including when the request is for a
supplemental ANDA under 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(4))—in accordance with 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.97,
§ 314.70(b)(4) applies to ANDAs—or at the FDA’s initiative. Id.
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another advanced country, if the FDA has determined that the foreign
assessment is equivalent and that the authority enforces standards for
good manufacturing practices that are as high as its own. 298
Under the second option, the FDA could act on behalf of the HHS
secretary and use its authority to permit the importation of unapproved
drugs that have been approved in foreign jurisdictions when necessary
to alleviate a drug shortage; the FDA would only do so after ensuring
that the relevant drug is of adequate quality.299 It is already FDA policy
to prioritize applications for generic drugs that “could help mitigate or
resolve a drug shortage and prevent future shortages.”300 The FDA
should recognize that rectifying inadequate competition is also a means
to prevent future shortages.301 The governing statute does not require
importation be temporary, and removing that policy restriction would
help to lower the cost of applying for generic drug approval in multiple
country markets and to achieve the objective of preventing and
remedying generic drug shortages more sustainably.
Making importation a temporary measure would assuage
understandable concerns that importation measures might undermine
domestic pharmaceutical production and cut the FDA out of drug
regulation. The majority of finished generic drugs and API are already
manufactured abroad. Restricting this mechanism to temporary
importation would discourage foreign firms from incurring the fixed
costs of expanding manufacturing to serve the U.S. market. In our
proposal, the FDA’s role in generic drug approval is preserved to require
different labeling and to reject otherwise qualified candidates for
import pursuant to a detailed opinion explaining its rationale.
Prescription drug importation can also include a fee to avoid
298. The FDA may also exercise its “enforcement discretion” in permitting the unapproved
versions of already FDA-approved drugs from designated stringently regulated markets, which
would subject them to less rigorous scrutiny than would ordinarily apply. This treatment would
be based on the FDA’s determination that the exporting nation’s standards and inspections would
comply with U.S. requirements. Alternatively, the FDA may affirm that the inspection and
approval standards, while not identical, provide equivalent public health protection and are
permitted entry as satisfying U.S. law. Richard Merrill, the former FDA general counsel, wrote:
It is possible, I suppose, that FDA could respond: “We have always acknowledged that
there was more than one approach to meeting the [FDCA]’s substantive requirements;
now we are simply recognizing that, e.g., the U.K. approach, is one of them.” If such a
response were a plausible historical account, FDA’s agreement would simply represent
a formal recognition of what had always been the law.
Merill, supra note 18, at 753–54; see also Theodore Ruger, FDA Reform and European Medicines
Evaluation Agency, 108 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2020 (1999) (proposing the approval by EU centralized
procedure quality as “substantial evidence” under section 355(d) of the FDCA).
299. See 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(2) (2012) (authorizing the secretary to allow the importation of
drugs required for emergency medical care).
300. Greene et al., supra note 293, at 461.
301. Id.
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undermining the long-term role and viability of the FDA Office of
Generic Drugs or the GDUFA.
Under the third route, Congress could statutorily define an
appropriate evidentiary standard by which the FDA should assess
equivalence determinations of unapproved versions of FDA-approved
drugs from designated, stringently regulated foreign markets. It could
set an abbreviated statutory timeframe for decisions on such drugs, so
long as final power to reject a new generic drug remained with the FDA.
As is the case for the first two routes, the other needed
authorities are already in place. The FDASIA gives the FDA authority
to enter into agreements to recognize drug inspections conducted by
foreign regulatory authorities if the FDA determined those authorities
could conduct inspections that met U.S. requirements. 302 The FDAMA
adds international harmonization to the FDA mandate and enhances
its authority to enter into MRAs with other nations. Those
harmonization activities are subject to the same administrative legal
framework as are other parts of the FDA mandate.303 Neither of the
pathways we propose here would eliminate the FDA or its
decisionmaking in generic drug approval and so should not run afoul of
the U.S. Constitution’s Article I doctrine of nondelegation.304
If the FDA proceeds, it should do so pursuant to notice-andcomment procedures—irrespective of whether these are strictly
required—to ensure adequate public and stakeholder participation in
establishing this pathway for prescription drug importation.
6. Other Stringently Regulated Markets Have Similar
Generic Drug Approval Standards
The FDA should limit the use of this importation pathway to
generic drugs from countries with stringent national regulatory
302. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act § 712, 21 U.S.C § 384e (2012).
303. The FDA typically uses executive agreements, not treaties, to enter into commitments
with its foreign counterparts. See Horton, supra note 166, at 712–13. The process for concluding
those agreements is not overly burdensome: the State Department reviews and notifies Congress
of those agreements, as is required under the Case-Zablocki Act. Id.; see also Richard A. Merrill,
FDA and Mutual Recognition Agreements: Five Models of Harmonization, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
133 (1998) (discussing the different approaches under U.S. administrative law that the FDA may
undertake to implement the international equivalence agreements that it enters into).
304. The nondelegation doctrine limits the ability of Congress to delegate to statutorily created
administrative agencies the legislative powers vested in it by Article I of the Constitution: “All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1. Case law suggests that this system of prescription drug importation would likely
be considered constitutional so long as the FDA retains the final authority to approve new drugs.
Theodore Ruger, FDA Reform and the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 HARV. L. REV.
2009, 2023 (1995) (citing Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977) and R.H. Johnson & Co.
v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1952)).
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authorities and strong safety records,305 as determined through its
assessment of the equivalence of those generic drug approval processes.
Prior to starting that process, the FDA should establish reasonable
minimum standards for assessing the equivalence of the generic drug
approval processes of those regulators. Limiting the importation
generic drug approval pathway to countries that satisfy these
reasonable, science-based minimum standards is consistent with
requirements of WTO agreements.
Once those minimum standards for equivalence are laid out, the
FDA may assess its stringent regulatory agency counterparts and enter
into bilateral agreements with those regulators that meet those
minimum standards. Bilateral agreements can be as simple as MOUs.
Those agreements should establish common technical implementation
procedures and identify any nonequivalent aspects of the generic drug
approval process where the FDA may still need to be directly involved.
Many of the nations likely to be chosen already have reciprocal
inspection agreements with each other.306
Studies that have assessed generic drug regulation in the United
States, the EU, Canada, Australia, and Japan have found that there
are many more similarities than differences in these nations’
requirements.307 The standards for bioequivalence and study design are
largely the same across these countries. Some differences exist,
however, in the requirements for narrow therapeutic index drugs and
more highly variable drugs. These requirements are the subject of
current international harmonization efforts, but narrow therapeutic
index drugs can be excluded, if necessary, until those harmonization
efforts are complete.308

305. Examples might be Health Canada, the European Medicines Agency, the U.K. Medicines
and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), Australia’s Therapeutics Goods
Administration, New Zealand Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority (Medsafe), and
Japan’s Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA).
306. The EU (including the U.K.), Australia, Canada, and New Zealand already have
reciprocal MRAs on good manufacturing inspections. The EU and United States have an MRA for
each other’s inspections. See supra notes 162–165 and accompanying text.
307. Davit et al., supra note 260, at 986.
308. Crommelin et al., supra note 261, at 11 (noting that despite the extensive efforts at
the International Conference of Harmonization of Tehchnical Requirements for Registration
of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use to harmonize international regulations on narrow
therapeutic index drugs, “no real, total global consensus has been reached yet”). One potential
hurdle is the requirement in some nations that the reference drug used to establish
bioequivalence is from a domestic manufacturer. See Davit et al., supra note 260, at 976. As
long as the product is made using the same manufacturing specifications under license from the
original manufacturer, applicants would not have to obtain a sample of the reference drug from
each market and repeat the same bioequivalence tests.
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7. Other Regulatory Authorities Share an Interest
in Preventing Generic Drug Shortages
Canada and other nations have opposed reimportation
proposals, under which drugs marketed in the United States are
rendered inexpensive through foreign price controls and then imported
back into the United States, as threatening their drug supply and
potentially driving up prices. In contrast, this proposal for prescription
drug importation would permit manufacturers of versions of FDAapproved drugs entry into the U.S. market and would rely on
competition to reduce generic drug shortages and prevent price hikes.
By facilitating access to the U.S. market for older generic drugs, a
pathway for reciprocal approval would enable manufacturers to scale
and improve the viability of these product lines. Pursued in this
manner, other nations would share in the potential benefits that come
with greater access and the improved viability to international sources
of safe generic drugs.309
Many developed countries, including Canada and those in the
EU, are using more generics and adopting reforms to further encourage
their use and lower their prices. IQVIA estimates that generic
medicines will account for 31% of drug spending in the non-U.S.
developed markets, up from 29% in 2016 and 28% in 2011.310 In 2015,
the WHO convened a consultation on reducing global pharmaceutical
shortages. Resultant WHO reports noted that medicine shortages were
increasing internationally, particularly for older, off-patent drugs and
treatments that are difficult to formulate, including many of the same
drugs that are prone to U.S. shortages. According to the WHO, the
drivers of these shortages in other nations are similar to those in the
United States, including manufacturing quality and capacity
disruptions, competition issues and business decisions, and
market fragmentation.311

309. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Think Globally, Prescribe Locally: How Rational Pharmaceutical
Policy in the U.S. Can Improve Global Access to Essential Medicines, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 125, 139
(2008).
310. MURRAY AITKEN, MICHAEL KLEINROCK & DEANNA NASS, QUINTILESIMS INST., OUTLOOK
FOR GLOBAL MEDICINES THROUGH 2021, at 12 (2016), https://morningconsult.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/QuintilesIMS-Institute-Global-Outlook-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WN5V-4HPM].
311. Medicines Shortages: Global Approaches to Addressing Shortages of Essential Medicines
in Health Systems, 30 WHO DRUG INFO. 180, 181–82 (2016).
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8. Relevant International Standards Exist or Are Being Negotiated
This proposal would build on existing infrastructure. As part of
the ICH, the United States and other signatory national regulatory
agencies have developed a common technical document for drug
applications, as well as common guidelines on good manufacturing
practices, good clinical practices, and good regulatory practices.312
These forms and guidelines are the foundation of any international
cooperation on drug approval. Many developed nations that might be
subject to a prescription drug importation pathway (e.g., Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) already follow the ICH
Good Clinical Practice guidelines in assessing bioequivalence and ICH
GMP guidelines to ensure that products are properly produced and
packaged, as well as safe.
The United States already participates in the International
Generic Drug Regulators Pilot, along with the EU, Japan, China,
Mexico, and Brazil.313 Launched in 2012, this pilot aims to promote the
sharing of generic drug assessment-related data, the convergence of
technical and data standards, and the alignment of administrative and
regulatory assessment procedures.314 The pilot is also tasked with
creating a platform and database to promote deeper regulatory
cooperation on generic drug approvals in the future.315
In the past, we have argued that the FDA should leverage these
international standardization initiatives with other stringent national
regulatory authorities to establish a single electronic window for
applications for approval of generic medicines. This proposal is outlined
in depth elsewhere.316 It has the potential to reduce the transaction
costs involved in filing separate applications with each of the
participating regulatory authorities, to increase the number of generic
entrants, and to expedite applications.317
In 2018, the FDA initiated a push at the ICH for common
scientific and technical standards for the global development of generic
drugs. The proposal covered guidelines on standards for demonstrating
312. See ICH Standards: CTD, ICH, https://www.ich.org/page/ctd (last visited Aug. 31, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/Y2NX-2TPY].
313. Mike Ward, Regulatory Harmonization: The International Generic Drug Regulators Pilot
Project, 28 WHO DRUG INFO. 3, 6 (2013).
314. Id. at 6–7.
315. IGDRP Roadmap to 2020, INTERNATIONAL GENERIC DRUG REGULATORS PROGRAMME 7
(Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.fdanews.com/ext/resources/files/2017/01/01-09-17-IGDRPRoadmap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R3PF-MY8Q].
316. See Bollyky & Kesselheim, supra note 124, at 10.
317. Fiona M. Scott Morton, Entry Decisions in the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, 30
RAND J. ECON. 421, 436–38 (1999).
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bioequivalence for both non-complex dosage forms and for more complex
dosage forms and drug products. The goal of this harmonization effort,
according to the FDA, would be to ultimately support simultaneous
regulatory filings across multiple markets. 318
*

*

*

Two final caveats apply to our proposal for generic prescription
drug importation. First, this proposal puts greater demands on the
already scarce resources at the FDA. Negotiating and maintaining
international arrangements requires dedicated staff and funding. The
FDA has long struggled to increase its rates of foreign inspections of
manufacturing sites to rough parity with domestic inspection. This
strategy requires the appropriation of adequate resources for its
implementation, in addition to GDUFA fees.319 Furthermore, it
necessitates that the FDA enter into robust work-sharing
arrangements with participating regulators, including mutual
recognition of inspection reports. Generic prescription drug importation
may lower U.S. public and private healthcare costs over the long-term,
but it will require an upfront investment in the FDA to achieve.
Second, the long-term consequences of internationalizing the
generic drug market are unclear. It is possible that adopting the
pathways proposed here may lead to more consolidation in the
international generic industry because of greater economies of scale and
increased ability to operate across markets. That may lead to increased
efficiencies and lower costs; over the long run, it might also lead to fewer
suppliers that are willing to manufacture mature generics for small
patient populations. Adoption of the strategy proposed here would need
to be accompanied by careful continued oversight to recognize and
respond to any unintended market effects.
CONCLUSION
Prescription drug importation can work in the United States,
but only if it occurs under circumstances in which the FDA is willing to
accept the equivalence of the foreign national regulatory authority and

318. Gottlieb, supra note 281; see also Bollyky & Kesselheim, supra note 124, at 10 (discussing
a generic drug application pathway that would use a single application that would be submitted
to all participating national regulatory authorities).
319. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FDA HAS MADE
PROGRESS ON OVERSIGHT AND I NSPECTIONS OF MANUFACTURERS OF GENERIC DRUGS 7 (2015),
https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-13-00600.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7QX-GWLL] (noting that
the FDA “collected nearly $300 million in user fees” the year the GDUFA was implemented).

2 - Bollyky & Kesselheim_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

1400

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

10/13/2020 4:21 PM

[Vol. 73:5:1331

to rely on their oversight. Drawing from the literature on the political
economy of pharmaceutical regulation and international regulatory
cooperation as well as a close review of FDA’s past international
practices, this analysis has identified eight criteria for successful
international regulatory cooperation, including the equivalence
determinations that would enable U.S. prescription drug importation.
Taking these steps to leverage the activities of its foreign counterparts
will allow the agency to more effectively oversee U.S. drug imports, keep
pace with technological advances in personalized medicines, and
continue to ensure the quality and safety of complex global
pharmaceutical supply chains.320 What factors should guide successful
international regulatory cooperation is an important question for
administrative law and for making progress on persistent health policy
concerns, including U.S. generic drug shortages and price hikes, which
have gained even further relevance for public health with the onset of
the coronavirus pandemic.
The critically important role that generic drugs play in the
United States is in jeopardy due to changing dynamics in the domestic
generic drug marketplace that have reduced competition among generic
manufacturers. This competition is essential to ensure sufficient
supplies and reasonable prices.
The proposed U.S. prescription drug importation strategy
accords with the theory and practice of international regulatory
cooperation and accommodates the institutional and reputational
preferences of the FDA. It need not be pursued in isolation or preclude
U.S. Medicare programs from adopting a bargaining policy to reduce
prices as well. But, if implemented, generic prescription drug
importation has the potential to restore the balance required to
maximize competition, normalize prices, and put out of business those
who improperly thrive on market failures, all to the ultimate benefit of
the patients who depend on lifesaving generic drugs.

320. See COMM. ON MUT. RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS & RELIANCE IN THE REGULATION OF
MEDS., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 14; COMM. ON STRENGTHENING CORE
ELEMENTS OF REGULATORY SYS. IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 14; U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-933, supra note 14. The FDA has itself acknowledged the
necessity of increased international regulatory cooperation. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note
14, at 2.

